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To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries
1
I. INTRODUCTION: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT
On October 9, 2002, the United States Supreme Court hears oral
argument2 in Eldred v. Ashcroft. Eldred involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA).4 The CTEA extends, prospectively and retrospectively, the
terms of most copyrights by twenty years.5 The petitioners in Eldred
argue that the Act both "exceed[s] Congress's power under the
Copyright Clause" 6 and that its provisions violate the First Amend-
ment.7
In this Essay, I begin in Part I by framing the issues in Eldred v.
Ashcroft by discussing the history of copyright legislation in general
and the CTEA in particular and then summarizing the procedural his-
tory of Eldred v. Ashcrofi. I turn next in Part II to a detailed investi-
gation of the text of the Intellectual Property Clause, with a special
emphasis on the interpretation of the Clause by the first Congress
and early judicial decisions. Three elements of the constitutional text
have important implications for Eldred. First, the Copyright Clause
requires that Congress pursue the goal of promoting the progress of
science. Second, the meaning of science that best coheres with the
constitutional text and the original understanding can be glossed as
systematic knowledge or learning of enduring value. Third, if the
limited times restriction is to impose a meaningful limit on Con-
gress's power, the most plausible constructions are inconsistent with
either a term of life plus seventy years or with retroactive extensions,
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
3. Id.
4. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c),
302, 303, 304 (2000)).
5. See infra Part I.A., Table 1: Copyright Terms for Authors.
6. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter
Petitioners Brief].
7. See id. Although the thrust of Petitioners' argument is that the CTEA
violates the First Amendment, their argument is framed as a claim that the
CTEA must be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. See id.
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or both. In Part III, I provide a reader's guide to the debate over the
issues in Eldred v. Ashcroft, organizing some of the arguments made
by the contributors to this symposium around the questions on which
the Supreme Court will hear argument. Part IV concludes with an
overview of the difficult choice the Supreme Court must make.
A. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
The first Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1790.8 The
1790 Act granted to the authors of "any map, chart, book, or books"
the "sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending" the work for a "term of fourteen years" from the time the
title was recorded.9 The initial term could be supplemented by a re-
newal term: "if, at the expiration of the said term, the author or au-
thors, or any of them, be living... the same exclusive right shall be
continued to him or them, his or their executors, administrators or as-
signs, for the further term of fourteen years."' 0 In 1831, the twenty-
first Congress gave the authors of any "book or books, map, chart,
musical composition, print, cut, or engraving.., the sole right and
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" for a term
"of twenty-eight years from the time of recording the title."" In
1909, the renewal term was extended from fourteen to twenty-eight
years, for a possible total of fifty-six years.12
The pattern of a fixed term of years was broken in 1976. The
Copyright Act of 1976 provided for a term that began at the time of
creation and lasted until fifty years after the author's death.13
Anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works for hire were
protected for a term of seventy-five years from publication or 100
years from creation, whichever term was shorter. 14 The 1976 Act
provided the template upon which the CTEA is based. The CTEA
extends each of these terms by twenty years, giving individual identi-
fied authors life plus seventy years and anonymous, pseudonymous,
and works for hire, the shorter of ninety-five years from publication
8. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436.
12. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
14. See id. § 302.
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or 120 years from creation. 15 This history is discussed by Scott Mar-
tin in his piece, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the
Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, and a
summary is laid out in Table 1.16
Table 1: Copyright Terms for Authors
Date Initial Term Renewal Total Possible Term
Term
1790 14 yrs. 14 yrs. 28 yrs.
1831 28 yrs. 14 yrs. 42 yrs.
1909 28 yrs. 28 yrs. 56 yrs.
1976 Individuals: Author's life None Individuals: Author's life
plus 50 years plus 50 years
Anonymous, Anonymous,
pseudonymous, works for pseudonymous, works
hire: The lesser of 75 for hire: The lesser of 75
years from publication or years from publication or
100 years from creation 100 years from creation
1998 Individuals: Author's life None Individuals: Author's life
plus 70 years plus 70 years
Anonymous, Anonymous,
pseudonymous, works for pseudonymous, works
hire: The lesser of 95 for hire: The lesser of 95
years from publication or years from publication or
120 years from creation 120 years from creation
15. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2),
301(c), 302, 303, 304 (2000)).
16. See Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain. Exploring
the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 253, 259-65.
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The legislative history of the CTEA begins with hearings held in
1995 by the Senate Judiciary Committee 17 and the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property' 8 on
proposals to adopt a general extension of copyright terms. After ad-
ditional hearings by the House Subcommittee in 1997,19 reports were
issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 199620 and the House
Subcommittee issued a Report in 1998.21 This story is discussed in
detail by Professor Karj ala in his contribution to this Symposium22
and by Scott Martin, who examines this history from a very different
perspective. 23 Karjala reaches the following conclusions about the
evidence Congress considered:
" testimony supported the notion that current terms did not
provide adequate financial support for two generations
after the death of the author;24
" there was no evidence that the CTEA would achieve
substantial harmonization with the international copy-
right regime;2
5
* Congress heard conflicting evidence on the question
whether works will be disseminated more widely in high
quality forms if terms were extended;26
" Congress heard conclusory testimony that longer terms
would create incentives for the production of new works,
but no evidence rebutted the argument that the
17. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995).
18. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation:
Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995).
19. Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Composi-
tions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright per Program Licenses: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
20. See S. REP. No. 104-315 (1996).
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-453 (1998).
22. See Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension
Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 199, 206-22 (2002).
23. See Martin, supra note 16, at 287-89, 319.
24. See Karjala, supra note 22, at 208-10, 224-27.
25. See id. at 210-13.
26. See id. at 213-214.
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discounted present value of the additional incentive was
de minimis;
27
Congress heard testimony that term extensions were nec-
essary to give incentives to digitalize existing works.28
Karjala's article also undertakes an analysis of Congress's actual
motives in enacting the CTEA. 29 He makes the argument, familiar
from public choice theory, that the benefits of the CTEA were con-
ferred on a relatively small, relatively cohesive set of enterprises and
individuals, whereas the costs were widely diffused among the pub-
lic.30 Karjala hypothesizes that campaign donations by the firms and
individuals who benefited from the CTEA provide the best explana-
tion as to why it was passed.31 As Karjala acknowledges this sort of
effort is necessarily speculative, but his conclusions are intuitively
plausible. It is likely that most observers of Congress would affirm
something very much like Karjala's hypothesis.
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs and petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft filed a com-
plaint against the attorney general, then Janet Reno, in her official
capacity, challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA on its face.
32
Both the plaintiff/petitioners and defendant/respondents moved for
summary judgment,33 and the district court entered judgment for the
government.3§ Plaintiff/petitioners appealed and the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court
27. See id. at 214-18, 228-232.
28. See id. at 218, 221-22.
29. See id. at 232-36.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp. 2d I (D.D.C.
1999) at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint
_orig.html.
33. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C 1999) at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/jop-memo.html;
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defen-
dant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C 1999) at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/sjmemo.pdf.
34. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
Fall 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in a two-to-one decision. Judge Ginsburg wrote the opinion, and
Judge Sentelle dissented.35 Judge Ginsburg turned first to the First
Amendment challenge and he concluded that because the copyright
statute protects only expression and not ideas, the statute created a
"definitional balance" with the freedoms of speech and the press.
36
Hence, "copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment.
'
"
37
Judge Ginsburg then turned to the plaintiffs' argument that ret-
roactive extension was impermissible because already existing works
lack originality, and he rejected that argument on the ground that the
work remains original even after it is created.38 The opinion then
proceeded to the argument that the CTEA violated the "limited
Times" limitation in the Intellectual Property Clause. 39 Judge Gins-
burg rejected that argument on two grounds. First, any fixed period
is literally a "limited time." 40 Second, Judge Ginsburg cited 4 1 the
prior decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Schnapper v.
Foley,42 in which a prior panel of the Circuit had rejected the argu-
ment "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause consti-
tutes a limit on congressional power."
43
Judge Sentelle's dissenting opinion reframed the issue by cit-
ing44 the United States Supreme Court's landmark 1995 decision in
United States v. Lopez,45 which struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act on commerce clause grounds. His dissenting opinion then
argues that the general approach of Lopez should also be applied in
Eldred. The language of the Intellectual Property Clause "empowers
the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. That one thing is
'to promote the progress of science and useful arts."' 46  Judge
35. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36. Id. at 375.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 377.
39. See id
40. See id. at 377-78.
41. See id. at 378.
42. 667 F.2d 102 (1981).
43. Id. at 112.
44. See Eldredv. Reno, 239 F.2d at 381.
45. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
46. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d at 381.
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Sentelle then argued that the power to repeatedly extend copyright is
the power to confer an unlimited term:
[T]here is no apparent substantive distinction between per-
manent protection and permanently available authority to
extend originally limited protection. The Congress that can
extend the protection of an existing work from 100 years to
120 years; can extend that protection from 120 years to 140;
and from 140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in effect can
accomplish precisely what the majority admits it cannot do
directly. This, in my view, exceeds the proper understand-
ing of enumerated powers reflected in the Lopez principle
of requiring some definable stopping point.47
In addition, Judge Sentelle observed, "[t]he government has of-
fered no tenable theory as to how retrospective extension can pro-
mote the useful arts." 48 That is, a retroactive extension cannot pro-
vide an incentive to create new works.
The majority replied to this last point and argued that the CTEA
does promote the progress of science: "The Congress found that ex-
tending the duration of copyrights on existing works would, among
other things, give copyright holders an incentive to preserve older
works, particularly motion pictures in need of restoration. ' 49 Of
course, there is a question whether the means (extension of all copy-
rights retroactively) is proportionate to that end.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on February
19, 2002,50 and the order granting certiorari was modified on Febru-
ary 25, 2002, limiting the grant to the first two questions presented in
the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. 51 The two questions were as fol-
lows:
1. Did the D.C. Circuit err in holding that Congress has the
power under the Copyright Clause to extend retroactively
the term of existing copyrights?
47. Id. at 382.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 379.
50. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
51. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002).
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2. Is a law that extends the term of existing and future
copyrights "categorically immune from challenge[] under
the First Amendment"? 5 2
II. A TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COPYRIGHT
CLAUSE
The copyright power derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8, sometimes
called the Intellectual Property Clause, grants Congress the power
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 53 This section frames the con-
stitutional issues in Eldred by close and detailed exposition of the
constitutional text. This exposition is intended as a fresh look at the
text as it is illuminated by the early historical practice 54 including the
Copyright Act of 1790.55 Some of the conclusions that are reached
may be surprising. Certainly, the exposition that follows is not in-
tended as a guide to the contemporary doctrinal understanding of the
Copyright Clause.
52. Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at i.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. The approach of this section is broadly originalist. Of necessity, I elide
the theoretical debate over originalism, in its various forms, as a method of
constitutional interpretation. See generally Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship
and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984); Michael C. Dorf, Integrat-
ing Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Sub-
stantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211 (1993); Larry G. Simon, The Au-
thority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Lawrence Solum, Originalism as
Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
55. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, I 11 U.S. 53, 57 (1883)("The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first [copyright] act of
1790... by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many of
whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to
very great weight."); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1983)
(highlighting the importance of examining early historical practice to under-
standing constitutional issues).
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A. The Structure of the Clause
One starting point for exposition of the text is the structure of
the Clause. The Intellectual Property Clause has a complex struc-
ture. The twenty-seven words of the Clause provide both the copy-
right power and the patent power, distinguished by a parallel con-
struction that may not be transparent to contemporary readers. Once
the copyright clause is untangled, a further structural complexity is
laid bare-the power is defined by a specified end and then qualified
by a constrained means.
56
1. The parallel construction of the copyright and patent powers in
the Intellectual Property Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." 57 Three pairs of terms define
the fundamental structure of the clause: (1) science and the useful
arts, (2) authors and inventors, and (3) writings and discoveries. The
first term in each pair is associated with the copyright power; the
second term is associated with the patent power. 58 Thus, we might
resolve the single clause into two as follows:
Table 2: Parallel Construction of the Patent and Copyright Clauses
Congress by the
shall have securing exclusive
Power To Science for Authors Right to Writings
promote the limited their
Progress of: Times to: respective:
[the]
useful Inventors Discoveries
Arts
56. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (stating that the
copyright clause "describes both the objective which Congress may seek and
the means to achieve it").
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
58. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY 1N HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (2002); Peti-
tioners Brief, supra note 6, at 14.
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The pairing of "Authors" with "Writings" in the Copyright
Clause and "Inventors" with "Discoveries" in the Patent Clause rings
true to modem ears. With respect to the Patent Clause, the third term
in the triplet, the "useful Arts," may produce an antique tone, but the
meaning is clear and cohesive. However, the third member of the
copyright triplet, "Science," may have a dissonant tone to some mod-
em ears. The contemporary understanding of science is oriented to-
ward the natural sciences, and authorship is associated with artistic
creativity. Nonetheless, the structure of the Clause and its history of
exposition makes clear the parallel structure that associates "Sci-
ence," "Authors," and "Writings" with the copyright power.
59
The Intellectual Property Clause must be construed as a whole,
but it is also useful to focus on the Copyright Clause as it would ap-
pear if the Constitution had been drafted with two separate and dis-
tinct grants of power: "Congress shall have Power to promote the
Progress of Science by securing for limited Times to Authors the ex-
clusive Right to their Writings." 60 For the purpose of this exposition,
we shall refer to the language granting the copyright power in this
extracted form as the Copyright Clause, always bearing in mind the
caveat that it is the entire clause in the context of the first Article and
the whole Constitution that we are interpreting.
61
2. The structure of the Copyright Clause
What is the structure of the Copyright Clause itself? Let us be-
gin with the language, giving special attention to the key operative
terms, "Power to promote the Progress of Science" and "securing for
59. See, e.g., Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d
337, 367 (4th Cir. 2001); Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d
1267, 1271 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th
Cir. 1999). There is an ambiguity in the structure of the clause. Congress has
power to promote the progress of science and useful arts. Two readings are
possible. The first reading is that Congress has power "To promote the Pro-
gress of Science" and "To promote the Progress of the useful Arts." The sec-
ond reading is that Congress has power "To promote the Progress of Science"
and "To promote the useful Arts." The question is whether progress attaches
to the useful arts. In the context of Eldred v. Ashcroft, this ambiguity need not
be resolved.
60. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
61. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press 1991).
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limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writ-
ings. ' 62 Once we understand the relationship between these two
fundamental parts, it becomes clear that the Clause does not have a
"preamble" followed by a "power grant." Rather, the Copyright
Clause grants the power to pursue a goal and limits that power by
specifying the means that may be employed.
a. the Copyright Clause grants the power to pursue a goal and
limits that power by specifying the permissible means
The claim that the Clause has two fundamental parts is not con-
troversial. The language of the Clause compels recognition of the
linguistic fact that the meaning of the Clause derives in part from the
relationship between two phrases, one that specifies an end and an-
other that specifies a means. We might represent the division
graphically as follows:
Table 3: Ends and Means in the Copyright Clause
Ends Means
"promote the Progress "securing for limited Times to Authors the
of Science" exclusive Right to their Writings"
That is, the Clause specifies a goal or end, the progress of sci-
ence, and a means or mechanism, securing exclusive rights. The
question then becomes what is the relationship between these two
phrases. Our investigation of this question can proceed by consider-
ing each phrase in turn.
The first phrase is "to promote the Progress of Science." Con-
sideration of this phrase can begin by placing the phrase in context.
Article I, Section 8 introduces a list of enumerated powers. A basic
grammatical structure or syntax is common to all of the powers enu-
merated in the eighth section. This structure specifies that the sub-
ject of the sentence is "Congress," the verb phrase is "shall have"
and the direct object is "Power." The subject and verb appear only in
the first clause-"Congress shall have Power." Each individual
clause then begins with the preposition "To." Given this method of
composition, we have already established that the full copyright
clause is, in effect: "Congress shall have Power to promote the
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Progress of Science by securing for limited Times to Authors the ex-
clusive Right to their Writings." 63 This is, of course, a close para-
phrase, using only the words of the Constitution but eliminating
those words that are included in the other clauses of Section 8 and
the words in the Intellectual Property Clause that confer the patent
power.
What is the role of the phrase, "To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence"? An answer to this question can begin with the just-made ob-
servation that each of the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8,
is granted by using an identical construction. The syntax or gram-
matical structure of Section 8 is illustrated by the following table:
Table 4: Structure ofArticle I Section 8
From the first
five words of
Section 8
Clause 1
(this language is
contained only
in the first
clause)
Congress shall
have Power -->
From the remainder of Section 8 Clause 1 and the following
Clauses
Common use
of the
preposition
Tto"-
To --
Verb and direct obiect
(or verb, preposition and
indirect object) phrase
that express the nature of
the power
Qualifying
language that limits
the power granted
by the verb and
object phrase
lay and collect Taxes, but all Duties,
Duties, Imposts Imposts and
Excises shall be
uniform throughout
the United States;
pay the Debts... of the
United States
provide for the common
Defense and general
Welfare of the United
States
63. See id.
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From the first
five words of
Section 8
Clause 1
(this language is
contained only
in the first
clause)
Congress shall
have Power --
From the remainder of Section 8 Clause I and the following
Clauses
Common use
of the
preposition
Tto"-
To --
Verb and direct object
(or verb, preposition and
indirect object) phrase
that express the nature of
the power
Qualifying
language that limits
the power granted
by the verb and
object phrase
regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and
among the several
States, and with the
Indian Tribes;
establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization,
and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United
States
establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout
the United States
coin Money
regulate the Value [of
Money]
fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures
provide for the
Punishment of
counterfeiting the
Securities and current
Coin of the United
States
establish Post Offices
and post Roads
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From the first
five words of
Section 8
Clause 1
(this language is
contained only
in the first
clause)
Congress shall
have Power -
From the remainder of Section 8 Clause 1 and the following
Clauses
Common use
of the
preposition
"to"9
Verb and direct object
(or verb, preposition and
indirect object) phrase
that express the nature of
the power
Qualifying
language that limits
the power granted
by the verb and
object phrase
_____ _____ To -4 
__ 
_ 
_ _ 
_ _ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ _ 
_ _
promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts
by securing for
limited Times to
Authors and
Inventors the
exclusive Right to
their respective
Writings and
Discoveries;
constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme
Court
define and punish
Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high
Seas, and Offences
against the Law of
Nations
declare War
grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal
make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and
Water
raise and support Armies but no
Appropriation of
Money to that Use
shall be for a
longer Term than
two Years
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From the first
five words of
Section 8
Clause 1
(this language is
contained only
in the first
clause)
Congress shall
have Power --
From the remainder of Section 8 Clause 1 and the following
Clauses
Common use
of the
preposition
Ttoll
To --
Verb and direct object
(or verb, preposition and
indirect object) phrase
that express the nature of
the power
Qualifying
language that limits
the power granted
by the verb and
object phrase
provide and maintain a
Navy
make Rules for the
Government and
Regulation of the land
and naval Forces
provide for calling forth to execute the
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
Laws of the Union, suppress
suppress Insurrections Insurrections and
and repel Invasions repel Invasions
provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining,
the Militia, and for
governing such Part of
them as may be
employed in the Service
of the United States
reserving to the
States respectively,
the Appointment of
the Officers, and
the Authority of
training the Militia
according to the
discipline
prescribed by
Congress
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From the first
five words of
Section 8
Clause 1
(this language is
contained only
in the first
clause)
Congress shall
have Power -->
From the remainder of Section 8 Clause 1 and the following
Clauses
Common use
of the
preposition
to"
To --
Verb and direct obiect
(or verb, preposition and
indirect object) phrase
that express the nature of
the power
exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such
District... as may, by
Cession of Particular
States, and the
Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the
Government of the
United States
to exercise like
Authority over all Places
purchased by the
Consent of the
Legislature of the State
in which the Same shall
be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards
and other needful
Buildings
Qualifying
language that limits
the power granted
by the verb and
object phrase
(not exceeding ten
Miles square)
Although the various grants of power in the eighth Section of
the first Article are varied in both content and structure, there are,
nonetheless, striking similarities in the syntax or grammatical struc-
ture of the several clauses. Each clause is introduced by the words,
"Congress shall have Power," but these words appear only in the first
clause. The word "To" appears twelve times. In each and every
grant of power, the operative language that enumerates the particular
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power begins with a verb in its infinitive form, e.g., to lay, to collect,
to pay, to provide, and so forth. The expression of each power is
completed by adding either (1) a direct object or (2) a prepositional
phrase including an indirect object. So, Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts of the United States, to pro-
videfor the common Defence, etc. 64 In some cases, a further qualify-
ing phrase follows, e.g., the power to raise and support armies is
qualified by the independent clause, "but no Appropriation of Money
to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years."
65
Two clauses in the eighth section express a grant of power and
limitations of that power through the specification of a means-ends
relationship. The first of these is the first Militia Clause. That clause
grants the power to use a means and qualifies that power by specify-
ing the ends for which it may be exercised: "To provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions.' 66 The means specified is "to provide for
calling forth the Militia" and the ends to which the means may be
employed are "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions." 67 In this case, the power granted is Con-
gress's power to call forth the Militia; that is, the power granted is
the power to employ a means. That power is then limited by the
ends specified.68
The second clause to express a means-ends relationship is the
Intellectual Property Clause. Recall the language of the Copyright
Clause: "Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of
Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclu-
sive Right to their ... Writings .... ,,69 In the case of this Clause, the
infinitive is "To promote," and the object is the noun phrase "the
Progress of Science." Thus, the power granted is the power to pur-
sue an end or goal, promotion of the progress of science. That power
64. See id. art. I, § 8.
65. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
66. See id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
67. Id.
68. Malla Pollack notes the structural similarity in her contribution to this
symposium. See Malla Pollack, Dealing With Old Father William, or Moving
from Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review
of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 349-53
(2002). [hereinafter Pollack, Progress Clause Review].
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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is then qualified by specifying the particular means or mechanism
that may be used, "by securing for limited Times to Authors... the
exclusive Right to their... Writings."
70
The Intellectual Property Clause, like every clause in the eighth
Section of the first Article, grants a power with an infinitive phrase
and a corresponding direct or indirect object. The Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause, unlike the majority of the clauses of the eighth Article,
includes a phrase that qualifies and limits the power granted. Like
the second Militia Clause, the grant and limitation operate through
the specification of means and ends. Unlike the second Militia
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause grants the power to pursue a
goal and then qualifies that power by specifying the permissible
means. In this respect, the Intellectual Property Clause is unique
among the powers granted by the eighth Section of the first Article.
71
It should not be surprising that a power granted in the form of the
power to pursue a goal should be limited by the specification of per-
missible means. The alternative would be a power to employ any
means that furthered the goal, and such a power would not fit the
general design of Article I, Section 8, which lays out a scheme of
limited and enumerated powers. 7
2
Thus, the fundamental structure of the copyright power is con-
firmed both by the plain language of the Clause and the structure of
Article I, Section 8. Congress is given power to pursue an end-
promotion of science; and that power is limited by the specification
of the means that Congress may employ-the securing to authors of
the exclusive right to their writings for limited terms.
70. Id.
71. See Dan T. Coenen & Paul J. Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright
Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 99, 105-06.
72. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that the interstate
commerce power had been phrased in terms of a general goal, e.g., "to promote
commerce among the several States." The general pattern of the eighth Sec-
tion would then require that the power be qualified. For example, the Clause
might have read, "To promote commerce among the several states, by making
uniform regulations of trade and navigation."
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b. the preamble interpretation is inconsistent with the plain
language of the Clause
None of this analysis of the plain meaning language of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause should be controversial, but there is a strand
in the literature and some judicial opinions that deserves special
comment. Sometimes, the Intellectual Property Clause is described
as containing a preamble followed by a grant of power.73 This would
be the structure of the Clause if it were worded, "Whereas the pro-
motion of the progress of science shall advance the general welfare,
the Congress shall have power to secure to authors the exclusive
right to their writings for limited terms." 74 There are provisions of
the Constitution that are rightly classified as preambles in the sense
that the counterfactual version of the Intellectual Property Clause
would have a preamble. The most prominent preamble is, of course,
the Preamble that begins the Constitution with the words, "We the
People. 75 Another prominent example of a preamble is the intro-
ductory phrase to the Second Amendment, "A well regulated militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed., 76 These are examples
where the plain language and structure of the Constitution make it
clear that some language operates as a preface stating the goal to be
served by the language that follows, as in the case of "We the peo-
ple."
In the case of the Militia Clause, the preamble states a claim of
fact: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state .... 77 It is clear, therefore, that the preamble of the
73. See Brief for the Respondent at 19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper
Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don't Know Where We Want to Go, We're
Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 289, 303 n.66
(2000-2001); Martin, supra note 16, at 299.; see also Hutchinson Tel. Co. v.
Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing
to M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-30.2 to 1-30.3 (1984));
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (1981) (rejecting view "that the intro-
ductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional
power").
74. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
75. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
77. Id.
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Second Amendment is not the legally operative language, because
the speech act of making an assertion is of a different kind than the
speech act of creating a right.78 There is a growing body of scholarly
literature on the meaning of the Second Amendment, and the role of
the preamble is much disputed.79
This is not to say that preambles do not play an interpretive role.
The general preamble to the original Constitution and the preamble
to the Second Amendment arguably should guide our interpretations
of the Constitution as a whole and of the right to bear arms, respec-
tively.80 But these prefacing statements are truly preambles and so
should be distinguished from the Intellectual Property Clause, which
has a wholly different structure.
Given the plain language of the Intellectual Property Clause and
the structure of Article I, Section 8, the notion that the Clause con-
sists of a preamble followed by a power grant is simply unsustain-
able. First, the phrase "To promote the Progress of Science" con-
tains the grant of power. As Judge Sentelle expressed this point in
his Eldred dissent: "That clause empowers the Congress to do one
78. JOHN AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 147-63 (Univ. Press
Oxford 1967) (1962) (outlining theory of speech acts).
79. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus
on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996); Glenn Harlan Rey-
nolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461
(1995); Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy and Statu-
tory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REv. 431 (2001); Sanford Levinson, Comment,
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
80. The most prominent example is BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991). Akil Amar wrote:
Although most modem interpreters skate past the Preamble, it features
prominently in early expositions such as Hamilton's opinion on the
first national bank, and Marshall Court landmarks such as Marbury v.
Madison, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, and McCulloch v. Maryland.
This is no accident. The Preamble launches the Constitution: Its eye-
catching and accessible prose is the first thing people read, and we
should construe all that follows in its light.
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 26, 54 n.85 (2000); see also Raymond B. Marcin, "Posterity" in the Pre-
amble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 273 (1993) (explain-
ing that the preamble secures liberty to both ourselves and our posterity); Eric
M. Axler, Note, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The
Restoration of the People's Unenumerated Rights, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
431 (2000) (explaining the importance of the preamble and that the preamble
might continue to play a role in judicial decisions over the Constitution.)
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thing, and one thing only. That one thing is 'to promote the progress
of science and useful arts.' 8' The Supreme Court stated in Deep-
south Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.82 "[t]he direction of Art. I is that
Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts."
83
Second, the operative role of "promote the Progress of Science"
in the Intellectual Property Clause is confirmed by the uniform and
invariable pattern of the grants of power in Article I, Section 8. In
each and every case, the power is granted using a particular syntax,
an infinitive verb followed by an object, either direct or indirect. In
the copyright portion of the Intellectual Property Clause, "To pro-
mote" is the infinitive verb and "the Progress of Science" is the di-
rect object.
Third, comparing the other clauses, including limitations on
power, confirms that the phrase beginning "by securing to Authors"
is a limitation on the power granted and not the power itself. The
pattern of limitation is to grant the power in the first part of the
clause and then to limit the power in the second part.
84
Fourth and finally, comparison of the Intellectual Property
Clause with the first Militia Clause makes it clear that the promotion
of science is the power granted and the securing of exclusive rights
operates as a limitation on the means that may be used in employing
this power. When the Framers chose to grant the power to use a
means and limit that power by specifying a goal, they were able to do
so in clear and unequivocal fashion.
Each of these points is obvious and compelling; cumulatively,
they leave no room for doubt. Their recitation would be unnecessary
except for the frequent reference to the imaginary "preamble" of the
Intellectual Property Clause. The erroneously labeled "preamble" is
actually the legally operative grant of power. Why does it matter
whether we call the first phrase in the Intellectual Property Clause a
"preamble" or a "power grant"? Of course, it need not matter.
Courts could call the first phrase a "preamble" but give it the same
81. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
82. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
83. Id. at 530.
84. There is one exception to this rule. The power of Congress over the
District of Columbia is limited by a parenthetical phrase, "(not exceeding ten
Miles square)." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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legal effect as if it were the grant of power. The terminology is im-
portant, however, when we consider the reverse possibility. Courts
could not coherently recognize that the first phrase, "To promote the
Progress of Science," is the grant of power but treat that phrase as a
mere preamble that does not in any way constrain the exercise of the
power. This is not to say that courts could not call the first phrase a
grant of power but treat it otherwise. Courts are no different than the
rest of us; they can contradict themselves as they please. But a court
that aims at coherence cannot recognize the syntactic role of the first
phrase and simultaneously assert that its plain meaning is merely
hortatory.
85
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the language "To
promote the Progress of Science" does contribute meaning to the In-
tellectual Property Clause in patent cases. For example, in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 86 the Court stated, "The Pat-
ent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage in-
novation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and
useful Arts."' 87 Given the parallel construction of the Copyright
Clause, it would seem to follow that when Congress exercises the
copyright power, it must avoid monopolies that stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the progress of science. In Lee
v. Runge,88 Justice Douglas confirmed that what is good for the pat-
ent power is good for copyright: "While this Court has not had many
occasions to consider the constitutional parameters of copyright
power, we have indicated that the introductory clause, 'To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' acts as a limit on Congress'
power to grant monopolies through patents." 89 Although he was
writing in dissent, Justice Douglas's observation is surely correct.
The structure of the Intellectual Property Clause will not support a
reading that construes the power-granting phrase as a limit on power
85. This does not rule out the possibility that a court would conclude that it
is Congress rather than the court that should determine the meaning of the first
phrase.
86. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
87. Id. at 146.
88. 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
89. Id. at 888-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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with respect to patents but construes the very same phrase as merely
hortatory with respect to copyright.
B. Words and Phrases: The Meaning of the Key Language
So far we have examined the general structure of the Intellectual
Property Clause. Two conclusions have followed from this examina-
tion. First, from the parallel construction of the Copyright and Patent
Clauses, we can discern the operative language of the grant of the
copyright power: "Congress shall have Power To promote the Pro-
gress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to their ... Writings .... " Second, this grant of
copyright power is comprised of two elements: (1) Congress is
granted the power to pursue a means, promotion of the progress of
science, and (2) that power is limited by particular means, securing
to authors the exclusive right to their writings for limited terms. The
next step is to examine each of these components separately. For
ease of exposition, I shall begin with the meaning of the means and
then proceed to the meaning of the ends.
1. The meaning of the means limitation
Congress's power to promote the progress of science is limited
by the specification of a particular means. The promotion can only
be accomplished "by securing for limited Times to Authors the ex-
clusive Right to their Writings." Each of the operative phrases con-
tributes to the meaning of the limitation.
a. by securing
The first phrase is "by securing." The word "securing" is the
gerund form of the transitive verb secure. From context, 90 we can
discern that the intended meaning is closely related to the Oxford
90. My approach is that part of the Essay is to focus on the text. This re-
quires attention to the meaning of individual words in context. See Tiersma,
supra note 79, at 453-55. Ultimately, it is the whole context that matters. The
words of each clause must be interpreted in light of the whole section, the
whole article, the whole Constitution, and the complex web of events that re-
sulted in its drafting, ratification, and early implementation. Each part is inter-
preted in light of the whole; the meaning of the whole is interpreted in light of
each part. See HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 265-66 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1986).
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English Dictionary's definition,91 "[t]o establish (a person) securely
in some position, privilege, etc." 92 Closer still is the related defini-
tion, "[t]o make the tenure of (a property, office, privilege, etc.) se-
cure to a person." 93 The means specified are to make tenure of a
right to copy secure to a class of persons, i.e., to authors. The prepo-
sition "by" has a vast multiplicity of meanings, but the most relevant
may well be "[i]ntroducing the means or instrumentality: = by means
of,"; the thirtieth definition offered by the Oxford English Diction-
ary.94 The relevant sense in context is that Congress may promote
91. On the role of dictionary definitions in interpretation, see Ellen P.
Aprill, The Law of the Word.- Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 335 (1998).
92. 14 J.A. SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY 852 (2d
ed. 1989). The illustrations for this definition are:
1712 SwIFT Jrnl. to Stella 27 Dec., Steele I have kept in his place.
Congreve I have got to be used kindly, and secured. Rowe I have rec-
ommended, and got a promise of a place. 1713 ADDISON Cato v. i,
The Soul, secur'd in her Existence, smile's At the drawn Dagger, and
defie's its Point. 1874 GREEN Short Hist. iii. §3 (1882) 125 The towns
were secured in the enjoyment of their municipal privileges.
Id.
The last example is closest in meaning to the intellectual property clauses use
of "securing."
93. Id. The examples are:
1736 BUTLER Anal. I. iv. Wks. 1874 1. 82 Our whole present interest is
secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours. 1825 SCOTT Be-
trothed Introd., The shareholder might contrive to secure to his heirs a
handsome slice of his own death-bed and funeral expenses. 1856
FROUDE Hist. Eng. (1858) 1. ii. 150 Her right to the succession. .would
have been readily secured to her by act of parliament.
Id.
94. Id. at 728. The illustrations are:
al000 Scopes Widsio 100 Ic be songe secan sceolde. c1205 LAY.
28337 Ich wuste bi mine sweuene whwet sor3en me weoren 3enetye.
c1300 K. Alis. 2941 That Y have by lettre yow saide. c1340 CursorM
15986 (Trin.) He shal neuer rise a3eyn truly bi no my3t. c1380
WYCLIF Sel. Wks. III. 302 Pes feyned religious. .amortisen many grete
lordischipis bi fals title. c1450 Merlin x. 156 Thei remounted Gifflet
be fyn force a-monge his enmyes. 1548 LATIMER Serm. Ploughers
(Arb.) 34 Christe. .draweth soules unto hym by his bloudy sacrifice.
1548 UDALL, etc. Erasm. Par., Mark i. 14 The firste teachyng by
mouthe of Christes religion. 1573 G.HARVEY Letter-bk. (1884) 13
Nether to be allurid by prommissis nor persuadid bi wurds. 1628
EARLE Microcosm. iii. (Arb.) 4 Hee instructs men to dye by his exam-
ple. 1769 GOLDSM. Roman Hist. (1786) II. 475 He. .at last died either
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the progress of science by establishing an exclusive right in writings,
making authors secure in that right. An author could be said to be
secure in his exclusive right if the right were sufficient so as to
minimize any doubts about the efficacy of the right or to guard
against any threat to the right.
b. for limited times
While "securing" is relatively uncontroversial, "for limited
Times" is quite the opposite. The most relevant definition of limited
is "[c]ircumscribed within definite limits, bounded, restricted." 95
by poison or madness. 1855 KINGSLEY Glaucus (1878) 167 The bird's
foot star. .you may see crawling by its thousand sucking feet. 1866 -
Herew. Prel. 6 Trying to expiate by justice and mercy the dark deeds
of his bloodstained youth.
Id.
95. 8 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92 at 966. The illustrations for this
definition are:
1610 WILLET Hexapla Dan. 259 The knowledge of angels is limited.
1648 R. FILMER (title) The anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy.
1651 HOBBES Leviath. II. xix. 98 That King whose power is limited, is
not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it. 1674 Es-
sex Papers (Camden) 1. 265, 1 cannot imagine what it is makes men in
England believe ye Govermt of Ireland to be for a Limited Time of
Three Years. 1710 in T. B. Howell State Trials (1812) XV. 62 The na-
ture of our constitution is that of a limited monarchy. 1736 CHANDLER
Hist. Persec. Introd. 5 The blessings of a limited government. 1789
Gouv. MORRIS in Sparks Life & Writ. (1832) II. 72 The King of
France must soon be one of the most limited monarchs in Europe.
a1792 BURKE Address Brit. Colonists N. Amer. in Works (1812) V.
148 England has been great and happy under the present limited Mon-
archy. 1828 SCOTT F.M Perth xxi, I thank your Highness,. .for your
cautious and limited testimony in my behalf. 1832 AUSTIN Jurispr.
(1879) 1. vi. 247 In limited monarchies a single individual shares the
sovereign powers with an aggregate or aggregates of individuals. 1833
MYLNE & KEEN Reports II. 244 His co-executor. .was in narrow and
limited circumstances. 1853 BRONTE Villette viii. (1876) 68 That
school offered for her powers too limited a sphere. 1860 TYNDALL
Glac. I. ii. 15 A limited number of images only will be seen. 1865
MOZLEY Mirac. iv. 86 A limited Deity was a recognised conception of
antiquity. 1866 DICKENS Mugby Junction in All Year Round Extra
Christmas No. 10 Dec. 17 Driving. .at limited-mail speed. 1879 F. R.
STOCKTON Rudder Grange ix. 93 Time flew like a limited express
train. 1883 P. FITZGERALD Recreat. Lit. Man 80 He started for Dublin
by the mid-day limited mail. 1890 Harper's Mag. Aug. 409/1 Coming
up by the limited train, Miss Lee was not favorably impressed. 1903
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"Times" is understood to have the same sense as does the plural noun
"terms," familiar from its use in the copyright statutes. A relevant
definition is "[a] limited stretch or space of continued existence, as
the interval between two successive events or acts, or the period
through which an action, condition, or state continues; a finite por-
tion of 'time' .. . , as a long time, a short time, some time, for a
time. "96
Connoisseur VI. 252/2 This library has the trail of the 'Limited Edi-
tion' serpent over it all. 1904 Dial (Chicago) 16 Oct. 238 It is not a
book for the limited express. 1920 H. CRANE Let. 28 Jan. (1965) 32 A
limited edition hastily gathered up would be the only possible method
of presentation. 1930 Limited edition [see HOG-WASH]. 1944 H.
TREECE Herbert Read 41 The Quixote in him that writes prefaces to
Limited editions. 1948 H. J. MORGENTHAU Politics among Nations
xx. 291 Another variety of a limited war. .has been well described.
1955 Times 4 July 9/7 Britain, then, has to be prepared for both nu-
clear and limited war. Ibid. 8 July 9/5 The recent war in Korea is an
example of a major limited war, and the present operations in Kenya
of a minor limited war. 1966 MRS. L. B. JOHNSON White House Diary
20 Aug. (1970) 413 It was a good speech [by Lyndon]. .'Perhaps it re-
flects poorly on our world that men must fight limited wars in order to
keep from fighting larger wars.' 1971 Ideal Home Apr. 143 This Pic-
cadilly mug is produced by Wedgwood in a limited edition of 4,000.
1972 Country Life 16 Nov. (Suppl.) 57/1 Pure silk 36 inch hand-rolled
head-scarves, in four designs. .and in limited editions for £12.50. 1973
Daily Tel. 27 Apr. 18 The National Maritime Museum. .is adding two
new clocks to its collection of historic timepieces next month. The
two, however, are replicas of 18th-century clocks which Thwaites and
Reed are producing in limited editions.
Id.
96. 18 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92 at 100. The illustrations are:
c893 K. AELFRED Oros. IV. v. §5 Ymbe 6one timan Pe Piss wes.
c1000 ELFRiC Hom. 1. 60 Hit wws 3ewunelic on 6am timan. a1225
Leg. Kath. 437 He heold on. .long time of Pe dei. c1330 R. BRUNNE
Chron. Wace (Rolls) 4190 [Caesar] tok his leue. . To wende fro Pem
for longe teymes. 1377 LANGL. P. Pl. B. xvii. 63 And tolde whi Pat
tempest so longe tyme dured. c1386 CHAUCER Clerk's T. 386 Nat
longe tyme after that this Grisild Was wedded, she a doghter hath
ybore. c1440 Promp. Parv. 494/1 Tyme, idem quod tyyde (P. tyme,
whyle, tempus). 1572 FORREST Theophilus 263 in Anglia VII, By so
longe tyme as his busshoppe dyd lyue. 1610 SHAKS. Temp. III. ii. 93
After a little time lie beate him too. 1662 GERBIER Princ. 28 No New
Building could stand any time without Proppings. 1662 STILLINGFL.
Orig. Sacr. III. iv. §5 The highest mountpins in the World. .may be as-
cended in three dayes time. 1670 SIR S. CROW in 12th Rep. Hist. MSS.
Comm. App. v. 15 [Hangings] that-for a time-will look better to the
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It is clear that a limited time is not an infinite one. If this were
the only constraint imposed by this phrase, it would be a trifling con-
straint indeed.97 Congress might specify terms measured in centuries
or millennia without approaching infinity. 98 Indeed, any period or
term at all, even one that would exceed the expected life of the Sun
would be limited in this sense. This possibility motivates the search
for some other constraint. Because there are finite spans of time that
are unlimited for the purposes of humans, the phrase limited times
must mean something other than a finite term if we are to attribute to
the Framers some purpose in using the word "limited."
Consider first the possibility that "limited" means "brief' or
"short in duration." Given that the first Copyright Act specified a
term of fourteen years plus a like term of renewal, it might be argued
that the CTEA's term of authors' lives plus seventy years, being
eye. 1711 ADDISON Spect. No. 37 I It was some time before the
Lady came to me. 1762 KAMES Elem. Crit. (1833) 479 A child per-
ceives an interval, and that interval it learns to call time. 1794 MRS.
RADCLIFFE Myst. Udolpho xxv, Annette. .was absent a considerable
time. 1832 In no time [see NO a. 3b]. 1843 BORROW Bible in Spain
xxix. (1901) 417 Follow me. .and I will lead you to Finisterre in no
time. 1849 MACAULAY Hist. Eng. iii. I. 291 The time occupied. .was
not to exceed fourteen days in one year. 1875 JOWETT Plato (ed. 2) 1.
195 In less than no time you shall hear. 1842 BRANDE Dict. Sci., etc.
s.v., Absolute Time is time considered in itself without reference to
that portion of duration to which it belongs, however noted or marked.
1868 DK. ARGYLL in Mem. (1906) 11. xlvi. 540 Have we any link con-
necting time-relative with time-absolute?
Id.
97. Malla Pollack makes this point in her contribution to this Symposium.
See Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68, at 370-71. Although in
text, I say "trifling constraint," the truth is that Congress could not confer infi-
nite terms even if it tried to do so. No work will ever receive infinite protec-
tion; infinity is not some far future date that our remote descendents will
someday live through. Suppose that Congress conferred a copyright term that
was renewable every 100 years for as many times as the owner pleased. That
would still not be an infinite term, because every renewal period and the whole
term would always be finite in length. Moreover, Congress could find, as a
matter of fact, that no term would ever extend into infinity. For these reasons,
if limited merely means not infinite, there is no limit at all on Congress's actual
power. The only thing the clause would forbid would be the use of the phrase
"infinite term" or the equivalent in the text of copyright legislation. Thus, the
requirement of "limited times" would be a mere formality.
98. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright
Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 126-27.
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potentially quintuple the original term, would no longer qualify as
conceivably "limited." But without saying more, this interpretation
is unsatisfactory. Why would we say that twenty-eight years is brief,
but life plus seventy years is not? In the abstract and untethered to
any particular context, the distinction seems arbitrary. Clearly,
twenty-eight years is a very long time for some purposes. If a child
were to ask a parent for a balloon and the parent were to reply, "I'll
get you one in a limited time," or "you will have it shortly," but the
parent then waited twenty-eight years, the child would, if she re-
membered, rightly feel deceived or cheated. At the other extreme,
twenty-eight years is but a blink of the eye in geological or evolu-
tionary time. If an evolutionary biologist were to say, "The eye
evolved in a surprisingly limited time," we might expect the answer
to be one million years or one hundred thousand years or perhaps an
astonishingly brief ten thousand years. The lesson of these examples
is that a time is limited with respect to a context.
What then is the context of the phrase "limited Times" in the
Copyright Clause? The times that are to be limited are those of the
terms of exclusive rights in writings granted to authors. If society
tells an author, "You may have an exclusive right to publish your
work for a limited time," what would the author reasonably expect?
More relevantly, what would the Framers and ratifiers of the Consti-
tution have expected? "Limited" in this context must be measured
against the facts of human life in general and authorship in particular.
There are exceptions, but usually authors are adult humans, who, if
they do not meet with misfortune, have a normal full lifespan of
more or less seventy to ninety years (up from perhaps fifty to eighty
years some decades ago). 99 A productive adult life begins in the late
teens and usually ends in the late sixties to late eighties, depending
on health. Thus, the phrase "limited Times" must be construed as
bounded or restricted (to use the Oxford English Dictionary
99. The relevant lifespan is that of a normal human who does not die pre-
maturely of accident or disease, but who dies instead "of old age," that is, of
dysfunction that is the normal accompaniment of the aging process. Thus, dra-
matic increases in average lifespan from the founding era are irrelevant. Old
age is perhaps a decade later today than it was then, but the full human lifespan
has not changed dramatically. "Three score and ten" is still a good
approximation of the full span of a normal human life, but "four score" would
be more accurate.
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definition again) in the context of the time that individual human be-
ings spend as authors-that is, limited with respect to a period that
only very, very rarely would exceed seventy years.
Given this context, the period provided by the Act of 1790 is a
limited period. The original fourteen years and the renewal term of
fourteen years provided a total of twenty-eight years. In the context
of normal human lifetimes and the span of years during which an au-
thor might be productive, this is a long, but bounded or restricted pe-
riod. The term provided by the 1831 Act (an original term of twenty-
eight plus a renewal period of fourteen years) is in context, a very
long, but still bounded term. The 1901 Act (increasing the renewal
period to twenty-eight years for a total of fifty-six years) provided a
term that for the majority of authors would be practically unlim-
ited-fifty-six years would exceed the lifespan that would remain to
many authors after they created their first work, but for at least some
long-lived authors of those rare works with enduring market value,
this term would be bounded and definite for practical purposes. Of
course, with respect to individual works, a fifty-six year term is al-
most always the functional equivalent of an infinite term-because
works that retain value past a fifty-six year period are exceedingly
rare indeed.
If fifty-six years is arguably a limited time in the context of the
Copyright Clause, what about the terms provided by the 1976 act
(authors' life plus fifty years) or the CTEA (authors' life plus sev-
enty years)? Given the context, these terms are, for practical pur-
poses, unbounded. Consider first an analogous use of language.
Suppose that I were to offer my nephew the exclusive right to use my
beach house, but I said to him, "The house will be yours for a limited
time." My nephew asks, "How long is that?" If I were to say, "For
fourteen years and another fourteen if you are still living," he might
reply, "Wow, how incredibly generous." But if I were to say, "For
your life and for seventy years after that," he might say, "Wow, how
incredibly generous, but I must have misheard you. I thought you
said, for a limited time. Man, seventy years after I am dead! That's
forever as far as I am concerned."
Likewise, if society said to an author, "We will give you an ex-
clusive right to publish your book," and the author then asked, "How
long will that be?," the author would be astonished (but perhaps
pleased) by the answer, "For as long as you live, and then for seventy
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years after that." No one would use the phrase "limited time" to ex-
press the notion that the term granted would subsist for a whole hu-
man lifetime after the death of the author. One can square the term
"limited" with this span of time in many contexts and hence in the
abstract, but the phrase "limited Times" is not attached to the Intel-
lectual Property Clause in the abstract. Rather, the "limited Times"
in the Clause must be construed as limited in context. In this case, as
in so many others, there is no bright line that divides a limited term
from one that is not limited. Given the facts of human life and the
early historical practice, twenty-eight, forty-two or even fifty-six
years can reasonably be viewed as long but limited terms. Given
these same facts and clues to original understandings, life plus fifty
years or life plus seventy years cannot be viewed as limited.' 00 Al-
though no precise line divides that which is constitutionally permis-
sible from that which is forbidden, this should not be viewed as an
obstacle to judicial enforcement in cases in which Congress has ex-
ceeded its constitutional authority. Rather, terms that are not limited
in the context of exclusive rights granted to authors ought to be
struck down. In this way, the abstract and acontextual reading of
"limited Times" can be avoided, and with it, the consequence that
Congress might, consistent with the language of the Clause, confer a
100. Can any case be made that life plus seventy years is a limited term in
the context of the Copyright Clause? The best argument might begin with the
fact that the rule against perpetuities allows testators to control the disposition
of their estates for lives in being plus twenty-one years. That is, with respect to
property that is not intellectual (real and personal, tangible and intangible), the
owner can control the property of a term of life plus another life plus twenty-
one years. This term can easily amount to more than 100 years after the death
of the testator, if the measuring lives are carefully selected. It could be argued
that the rule against perpetuities provides a standard by which the term of a
property right can be measured for limitedness. This argument has some sup-
port in the context of the Intellectual Property Clause. Because the clause
grants the rights "to Authors," one might argue that the grant cannot exceed the
time during which the author or the author's will controls the property. That
upper limit is provided by the rule against perpetuities. In my opinion, this ar-
gument passes the so-called "laugh test." The question that court must face is
whether it is the best interpretation of the copyright clause. Given the histori-
cal practice and the purposes of the clause, the argument that "for limited
Times" means "not in violation of the rule against perpetuities" seems inferior
to an interpretation that limits the term to the life of authors. The two rules
come from radically different contexts. Another difficulty with the perpetuities
argument is that it would allow terms that are highly uncertain in duration.
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practically infinite but abstractly limited copyright term of 500 years
or even much longer.
Why would the Framers have sought to limit the term of copy-
right to an interval that is limited in the sense that it is "short" or
"brief' in the context of the grant of a monopoly to authors and in-
ventors? Justice Story offers one explanation:
It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government
should possess this power; to authors and inventors, be-
cause, otherwise, they would be subjected to the varying
laws and systems of the different states on this subject,
which would impair, and might even destroy the value of
their rights; to the public, as it will promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, and admit the people at large,
after a short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment
of all writings and inventions without restraint. 101
Because the first Copyright Act conferred a twenty-eight year maxi-
mum term, the early historical practice is consistent with the thesis
that "limited Times" means limited in the context of the granting of
exclusive rights to authors.' 
02
Consider a second reading of the phrase "limited Times" that
avoids the absurd consequence that Congress is empowered to confer
terms that are, for practical purposes, unbounded or unconstrained.
The term "limited" might be interpreted as meaning "fixed and cer-
tain," and hence a limited time would mean a definite, fixed, or cer-
tain term. Recall the Oxford English Dictionary definition:
"[c]ircumscribed within definite limits, bounded, restricted."',0 3 The
notion here is that terms must be definite in some practical sense;
they may not be indefinite. This interpretation might rule out terms
that vary with the life of the author, and likewise might rule out
terms that are contingent upon some other event, such as renewal.
More subtly, the requirement that terms be certain and not indefinite
may lead to Judge Sentelle's conclusion that the power to extend an
101. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 558 402 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987). This
passage is frequently cited. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2212 (1999).
102. The original patent term of 14 years is also consistent with this interpre-
tation. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
103. 8 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 966.
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already set term is inconsistent with the limitation to "limited
Times."'' 0 4 Thus, if "limited" means certain, definite, or fixed, fur-
ther interpretive questions arise. Each of these three possible impli-
cations requires some further investigation.
Consider initially the question whether a contingent term can
still be limited. The Act of 1790 granted an initial fourteen-year
term that was fixed and bounded. But what about the first renewal
term of fourteen years? Renewal was not automatic, but depended
on a contingency, i.e., that the author was living at the time the re-
newal term was granted. The two periods were both of definite
times, but a contingency triggered the second period. The early his-
torical practice suggests that this sort of contingency does not violate
the requirement that the rights be granted for "limited Times." Re-
newal terms are not certain in one sense; they depend on a contin-
gency. But renewal terms are certain in another sense, the contin-
gency is specified in advance and the term that will accrue upon
satisfaction of the contingency is also set in advance. The combina-
tion of the fact that the first Copyright Act included contingent re-
newal terms with the fact that such terms are definite in a meaningful
sense leads to the conclusion that "limited Times," even if it does
mean "fixed or certain times," does not rule out contingencies, so
long as they are specified or "limited" in advance.
Consider next the question whether a term that persists for the
lifetime of an author is limited in the sense that it imposes definite
bounds. There is no certain or definite upper boundary to the span of
a human life. We know that significant numbers of humans live past
100, and it is possible that some humans may live well past 120
years. It is even possible that medical science might some day sig-
nificantly increase the upper boundary. Still, for all practical pur-
poses, humans live for "limited Times" in the sense that their spans
are finite and clearly fall short of 200 years. On the other hand, hu-
man lives are of variable and unpredictable length. Some authors die
tragically in their teens or twenties; others live past the century mark.
It might be argued that both the 1976 Act and the CTEA exceeded
the grant of constitutional power when they made the authors' life
the basis for measuring the term of a copyright.
104. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.2d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Consider finally the question whether interpreting "limited" to
mean certain, fixed, or definite would entail the conclusion that Con-
gress may not alter a term already set. This question never came into
focus in the founding era. It was not until 1831 that Congress en-
acted a significant substantive alteration in terms. Recall that Judge
Sentelle argued in his dissenting opinion that the power to add exten-
sions, one by one, to a fixed term was the equivalent of the power to
create an unlimited term. 105 It might be argued in response that this
is only a theoretical possibility, and that the Court could strike down
such extensions if they occurred on a repeated basis. Here we are
considering a variation of Sentelle's argument. Substantial retroac-
tive extensions are inconsistent with the notion of a term that is lim-
ited, if limited means fixed, definite, or certain. Does this argument
run afoul of the fact that the Act of 1790 provided for a renewal
term? Arguably not, because the renewal term was fixed in advance,
whereas a retroactive extension is completely unpredictable, depend-
ing as it does on the will of future Congresses.
What about the fact that the Act of 1790 itself provided a retro-
active term for existing works? This first instance of retroactivity is
distinguishable from subsequent instances for an obvious reason.
Before the Act of 1790, there could be no certainty as to the duration
of copyright or patent, because a new constitution had just been
adopted, creating for the first time a new national power over copy-
right. Before 1790, there were no settled expectations that could be
unsettled by retroactive alteration in terms. Moreover, minor ad-
justments in copyright terms are also consistent with fixed, definite,
and certain terms. It is only a major or substantial retroactive altera-
tion that is unlimited, if we interpret the phrase "limited Times" in
the manner suggested.
If "limited" means fixed, definite, or certain, what reason or
purpose would the Framers have had for including the "limited
Times" requirement in the Constitution? One possible reason is sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 106 Festo is a patent case, but
its discussion of the patent monopoly would seem to apply with
equal force to the exclusive right created by copyright: "The
105. See id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
106. 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
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monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its bounda-
ries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, be-
cause it enables efficient investment in innovation."' °7 Substituting
authors for inventors, the next passage might be paraphrased as stat-
ing that the limited terms requirement creates a "delicate balance"
between authors, "who rely on the promise of the law to bring [writ-
ings] forth, and the public, which should be encouraged" to create
derivative works and to republish works, once copyrighted writings
enter the public domain.'10 Likewise in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,1°9
the Court made a similar point in the context of copyright: "Because
copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general
public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as pos-
sible."" Given the Court's view of this fundamental purpose of the
copyright laws, the argument that retroactive extensions today will
assure authors that they will benefit from retroactive extensions in
the future seems inconsistent with the goal of assuring the public that
they will have access to the public domain at definite times in the fu-
ture. Moreover, the Supreme Court's articulation of certainty as a
fundamental goal of copyright clause is consistent with the early his-
torical practice. The contingent renewal term of fourteen years al-
lowed for planning by potential users of the public domain in almost
all cases. Occasionally, an author expected to live might die prema-
turely, resulting in the unexpected entry of a new work into the pub-
lic domain, but the opposite case would almost never occur, authors
thought dead come back to life only in the rarest of circumstances. I
1I
In sum, we began with the possibility that "limited Times"
means only "finite terms." This interpretation renders the term "lim-
ited" superfluous, since it would allow Congress the power to grant
terms that, for practical purposes, are of infinite duration. This ob-
servation led us to the consideration of two alternative
107. Id. at 1837.
108. Id.
109. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
110. Id. at 527.
111. Thus, an author missing for several years might reappear just before the
original fourteen year term expired. This theoretical possibility does not
substantially undermine the high degree of certainty provided by the scheme of
1790.
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interpretations. The first interpretation reads the phrase "limited
Times" in the context of granting exclusive rights to authors, and
concludes that for a term to be limited, it must be bounded in the
context of the productive lifespan of authors. The first interpretation
supports the conclusion that Congress had approached the outer
boundary of "limited Times" in 1909 when it conferred terms of
fifty-six years. The second interpretation is to read the phrase "lim-
ited Times" to require definite or certain boundaries. This may lead
to the conclusion that authors' lives may not serve as the measure of
copyright terms; moreover, if "limited" means certain, fixed, or defi-
nite, then it would seem to follow that Congress may not signifi-
cantly alter terms once it has fixed them and laid out all of the con-
tingencies upon which they may change.
The language of the Intellectual Property Clause seems to com-
pel an interpretation that gives the phrase "limited Times" some
practical constraining force, and therefore we have good reason to
adopt one or both of these two interpretations (or some other alterna-
tive l 12) . We might adopt both interpretations, requiring that terms be
limited in the sense that they are bounded by the normal lifespan of
authors and that they be for a definite period of years. A potential
problem with this alternative is that it gives the phrase "limited
Times" two different, albeit, related meanings. Because the mean-
ings are related, it is possible to construe the phrase to include both
limitations, but we might also assume that the Framers would have
chosen two words if they wished to impose two conceptually differ-
ent limitations, i.e., "brief and certain" rather than simply "limited."
This consideration may lead us to choose between the two limiting
interpretations. If we choose only the second limitation, the phrase
"limited Times" would permit very long terms, i.e., 500 years, so
long as they were prospectively fixed by a definite span of time (in
years, months, or some other measure) with definite criteria for any
further contingent spans of time that were themselves definite in du-
ration. If we choose only the first limitation, then Congress would be
empowered only to choose a definite span, perhaps as much as a
decade or two longer than the fifty-six years provided by the 1909
112. There may be other constraining interpretations of the phrase "limited
Times" that avoid the practical infinity problem in a different manner. My re-
view of the literature has not revealed any significant and plausible candidate.
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Act, or perhaps to choose a less definite but constrained measure,
i.e., the author's life, as the maximum term. Congress would not,
however, be permitted to adopt the approach of either the 1976 Act
or of the CTEA.
Because the early historical practice is consistent with either
limitation, 113 we will need to look elsewhere to ascertain the meaning
of the Clause. Although the first interpretation may seem the most
natural, given the way the phrase "limited Times" operates in ordi-
nary language, the second interpretation meets the minimal criterion
that it does not render the constraining phrase "limited Times" prac-
tically meaningless. Even on the second interpretation, Congress
could not use an indefinite measure such as authors' lives or render
terms uncertain by changing them retroactively. Under either inter-
pretation, the CTEA itself is unconstitutional, either (1) because life-
time plus seventy years is not limited in the context of granting rights
to authors or (2) because the CTEA grants a retroactive extension
and hence allows Congress to avoid the requirement that the copy-
right regime must be certain, defined, or fixed.
c. to authors
The next phrase is "to Authors." Given the juxtaposition of
"Authors" and "their Writings," it seems clear that the intended
meaning of author is captured by the definition, "[o]ne who sets forth
written statements; the composer or writer of a treatise or book."'1 14
113. The Act of 1790 provided a term that was limited in relation to authors'
productive lifetimes (twenty-eight years maximum) and that was limited by
definite terms of years with definite criteria for the renewal term. See Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). Thus, the 1790 Act
meets both interpretations.
114. 1 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 797. The illustrations for this
definition are:
c1380 WYCLIF Wfks. (1880) 267 3 if holy writt be fals, certis god autor
Per-of is fals. c1385 CHAUCER L.G. W 88 Of manye a geste As aut-
ourys seyn. 1432-50 tr. Higden (1865) 1. 7 A tretys, excerpte of di-
verse labores of auctores. 1509 BARCLAY Shyp of Folys (1874) II. 26
The noble actor plinius. 1578 LYTE Dodoens 499 Wherof both Turner
and this Aucthor do write. 1678 R. LESTRANGE Seneca's Mor. To
Reader, My Choice of the Authour, and of the Subject. 1726 GAY Fa-
bles I. x, No author ever spar'd a brother; Wits are game-cocks to one
another. 1771 BURKE Corr. (1844) I. 275, 1 am not the author of
Junius, and. .1 know not the author of that paper. 1818 BYRON Beppo
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The exclusive rights granted by the Clause must be secured to the au-
thors of the work in which an exclusive right is established. As the
Supreme Court stated in Wilson v. Rousseau,"15 "[n]o authority is
conferred to bestow exclusive rights on others than 'authors and in-
ventors' themselves." 116 This suggests that this phrase may impose a
variety of restrictions on the means that Congress may employ to
promote the progress of science. First, the right conferred must be
conferred on the creator of the work and not on any other. Thus,
Congress could not by force of law confer on employers any exclu-
sive rights in the work of employees, although employees might,
consistent with the language of the Clause, be empowered to alienate
their exclusive rights by contract or gift. Second, the phrase "to Au-
thors" suggests that any newly conferred or created exclusive right
must be conferred on the author, although, once conferred, the right
could then be transferred by the author. Thus, the first copyright
statute allowed a renewal term of fourteen years by authors, but did
not allow assignees to renew. 117 Third, and related to the second
point, any congressional extension of copyright terms would have to
be secured to living authors."i8 Recall that the Act of 1790 made the
renewal term contingent upon the author being living at the time the
initial fourteen-year term expired." 19
The third restriction also operates in the limited context in which
Congress might retroactively confer an additional term on already
existing works. The newly created rights could only be conferred on
the original author of a work. This does not mean that an author
could not alienate in advance the contingent and speculative right to
newly created terms. 12 Rather, the implication is that Congress may
lxxii, One hates an author that is all author, fellows In foolscap uni-
forms turned up with ink, So very anxious, clever, fine, and jealous.
1880 Sat. Rev. 20 Nov. 653 What size will the author's writings attain
when she gets beyond her studies?
Id.
115. 45 U.S. (How.) 646 (1846).
116. Id. at 702.
117. See Act of May 31, 1790 § 1.
118. I am grateful to John Lubow for this important point.
119. See Act of May 31, 1790 § 1.
120. Many agreements transferring copyrights will be silent as to the effect
of future extensions of copyright. The argument proposed in text suggests that
Congress could not impose a rule that gave the extension period to the pur-
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not create new exclusive rights that are, by force of federal law,
automatically conferred on an assignee or employer as distinguished
from the author. These implications might be considered radical, and
certainly are inconsistent with Congress's recent practice. They are,
however, in accord with the plain language of the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause and with the earliest copyright legislation, the Acts of
1790 and 1802.
Are these implications of the plain language confirmed by the
early historical practice? The first turning point in terms of the
phrase "to Authors" comes with the 1831 Act, which provided the
first occasion upon which Congress added an additional "limited
Time[]" retroactively. Section 16 provided that the newly created
right (the extension period that resulted from the increase of the
original term from fourteen to twenty-eight years) would be con-
ferred upon the author or his heirs, as opposed to the proprietor or as-
signee.1 2 1 Section 16 of the 1831 Act goes beyond the narrowest in-
chaser of the original term. That argument does not imply that state courts
could not find that the default rule of contract law effectuated the transfer.
121. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 16, 4. Stat. 430. The 1831 revision
was enacted after the founding period had ended and the twenty-first Congress
did not include any members who had participated in the drafting of the Con-
stitution some forty years before. Section 16 does confer the newly created
terms on the heirs and estates of authors who were deceased in 1831. Section
16 reads in full:
Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That, whenever a copyright has
been heretofore obtained by an author or authors, inventor, designer,
or engraver, of any book, map, chart, print, cut, or engraving, or by a
proprietor of the same: if such author of authors, or either of them,
such inventor, designer, or engraver, be living at the time of this act,
then such author or authors, or the survivor of them, such inventor,
engraver, or designer, shall continue to have the same exclusive right
to his book, chart, map, print, cut, or engraving, with the benefit of
each and all the provisions of this act, for the security thereof, for such
additional period of time will, together with the time which shall have
elapsed from the first entry of such copyright, make up the term of
twenty-eight years, with the same right to his widow, child, or chil-
dren, to renew the copyright at the expiration thereof, as is above pro-
vided in relation to copyrights originally secured under this act. And
if such author or authors, inventor, designer, or engraver, shall not be
living at the passage of this act, then, his or their heirs, executors and
administrators, shall be entitled to the like exclusive enjoyment of said
copyright, with the benefit of each and all the provisions of this act for
the security thereof, for the period of twenty-eight years from the first
entry of said copyright, with the like privilege of renewal to the
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terpretation of the "to authors" limitation by conferring newly cre-
ated rights on widows, children, and heirs. However, it can be ar-
gued that by conferring newly created terms on heirs, Section 16
does observe the "to Authors" limitation, on the theory that the es-
tate, widow, and children are the continuation of the author as a legal
person. In any event, the actions of the first Congress are consistent
with the notion that the "to Authors" limitation has real bite and pre-
cludes Congress from acting directly to grant exclusive rights to
natural or legal persons who are not the authors of the works in
which the rights are granted.
d. exclusive rights
The Intellectual Property Clause uses the phrase "exclusive
Right[s]" in conferring both the patent and copyright powers. The
relevant sense of exclusive is captured by the following definition:
"Of a monopoly or grant: Excluding all other persons from the rights
conferred. Hence of a right, privilege, possession, quality, etc."'
123
widow, child, or children, of author or authors, designer, inventor, or
engraver, as is provided in relation to copyrights originally secured
under this act: Provided, That this act shall not extend to any copy-
right heretofore secured, the term of which has already expired.
Id.
122. Id.
123. 5 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 510. The illustrations are:
1765 T. HUTCHINSON Hist. Prov. Mass. i. 129 The French claim. .an
exclusive fishery upon the sea-coast. 1790 BURKE Fr. Rev. 20 The
king's exclusive, legal title. 1810 WELLINGTON in Gurw. Disp. V. 488
They must be under the immediate and exclusive command of their
own commanding officer. 1841 Punch 17 July p. iii, An experienced
nobleman. .who. .is frequently in a position to supply exclusive re-
ports. Ibid. 28 Aug. 81/2 (heading) Further particulars. (Particularly
exclusive.) Ibid. 13 Nov. 205/1 Our positive tone on the occasion
serves to show the exclusive nature of all our intelligence. 1844 H. H.
WILSON Brit. India lII. 477 The right of exclusive trade with India,
had been withdrawn from the Company. 1845 Douglas Jerrold's Shil-
ling Mag. I. 262/I What you get from me will be exclusive-from
your 'own' correspondent. 1847 Sporting Life 18 Sept. 52/2 It paid for
extensive and exclusive reports. 1861 W. BELL Dict. Law Scot. 354/1
Exclusive Privilege. .is used in a limited acceptation to signify the
rights and franchises of the nature of monopolies, formerly enjoyed by
the incorporated trades of a royal burgh. 1885 L 'pool Daily Post I
June 5/2 The Daily News. .has, by the accuracy of its exclusive infor-
mation, made, etc. 1928 D. L. SAYERS Unpleasantness at Bellona
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Constitutional jurisprudence has no problem with the concept of a
right. A reasonable definition is: "A legal, equitable, or moral title
or claim to the possession of property or authority, the enjoyment of
privileges or immunities, etc."' 24 Thus, an exclusive right in a writ-
ing would be a monopoly that was conferred on the author to exclu-
sion of all others. Hence, in the first Copyright Act, the exclusive
rights conferred were the rights to "printing, reprinting, publishing,
and vending" of the writing. 1
25
Club xix. 247 Hardy, with Fleet Street's delicate reticence towards the
man with an exclusive story, did not press the question. 1966 New
Statesman 13 May 680/3 The rival's story is no longer exclusive-it
can now be decently lifted: i.e. hastily rewritten.
Id.
124. 13 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92 at 923. The illustrations are:
a900 CYNEWULF Elene 909 (Gr.), Nu cwom elpeidi,. .hafa6 mec be-
reafod rihta ehwylces. c900 in Thorpe Dipl. Angl. Sax. (1865) 140 Pa
sona was Epelwald Pes wordes, Pwt he no Pes rihtes wi6sacan
wolde. a1300 Cursor M 3544 Pou sal neuer. .In Pi forbirth do claim
na right. 1375 BARBOUR Bruce 1. 78 He suld that arbytre
disclar,. .And lat him ryng that had the rycht. 1491 Act 7 Hen. VII, c.
20 §7 All such right, title, interesse, clayme. .as they. .have in any of
the premisses. 1525 LD. BERNERS Froiss. II. lii[i]. 188 Let the ryght
go to the ryght. 1544 tr. Littleton's Tenures (1574) 96b, The donee to
whom the release was made then had nothinge in the land, but onely a
righte. 1641 Termes de la Ley 129b, For when the Right, which is the
foundation and the principall, is released, by consequence the Action
.is also released. 1681 STAIR Instit. (1693) I. i. 161 All Real Rights
are either that original Community of all Men,. .Or the Interest which
Possession giveth, or Property. 1706 STANHOPE Paraphr. III. 334 Af-
ter all our boast of Settlements and Estates, nothing is or can be set-
tled, but the Fee and Original Right in the great universal Lord. 1768
STERNE Sent. Journ. (1778) I. 1 Strange!. .that one and twenty miles
sailing. .should give a man these rights. 1818 CRUISE Digest (ed. 2) 1.
172 The husband is entitled to all those rights and privileges which his
wife would have had if she were alive, and which were annexed to her
estate. a1853 ROBERTSON Lect. (1858) 747 Rights are grand things,.
.but the way in which we expound those rights. .seems to me to be the
very incarnation of selfishness. 1893 TRAILL Soc. Eng. Introd. p. xiii,
Association, however, necessarily creates rights and duties; from
rights and duties spring law and government.
Id.
125. See Act of May 31, 1970 § 1.
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e. to their writings
The final component in the limitation of the means is the phrase
"to their ... Writings." The possessive plural pronoun "their" un-
ambiguously refers back to "Authors." Writings might be defined as
follows: "That which is in a written (now also typewritten) state or
form; something penned or recorded; written information, composi-
tion, or production; literary work or compilation."'' 26 The first Copy-
right Act encompassed books, charts, and maps. In 1802, Congress
added designed, engraved, and etched prints to the list of writings.
27
The 1831 revision further expanded the list of writings to include any
"book or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or en-
graving."' 28 Technology has produced new forms of writing. Thus,
this Essay was written on a computer using a word processing pro-
gram. Sound recordings are "written" in binary code on compact
discs. Although an argument might be made that the copyright
power is limited to the particular forms of writing used at the time of
the framing, this crabbed construction would seem inconsistent with
the term chosen, "Writings," in light of the technological variety al-
ready present at the time of the framing (which allowed for pen and
ink, composed type, engravings, and so forth).
The Supreme Court, however, may have grafted an additional
meaning to the term "Writings" when read in conjunction with "Au-
thors." In The Trade-Mark Cases,129 the Court stated that the Copy-
right Clause required "originality."' 130 Of course, originality itself
requires analysis. If originality means only that a "writing" must not
be a copy to be protected, then the originality requirement would be
a logical extension of constitutional authorization to create "exclu-
sive" rights. One cannot be the "author" of a writing that one merely
copies. If originality means more, then its connection with the con-
stitutional text is far from clear.
126. 20 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 646.
127. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171.
128. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, § 1.
129. 100 U.S. 82(1879).
130. Id. at 94; see also Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 430-31 (1891) (a
mere label on a product does not secure a copyright and is not considered a
proper trade-mark).
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2. The meaning of the power grant
So far, we have considered only the limiting clause, focusing on
the phrase "by securing" and that which follows. Now, we turn our
attention to the power-conferring language, "Congress shall have
Power... to promote the Progress of Science ...." How can we in-
terpret this grant of power?
a. promote
The first operative term is "promote." The Oxford English Dic-
tionary offers the following definition: "[t]o further the growth, de-
velopment, progress, or establishment of (anything); to help forward
(a process or result); to further, advance, encourage."' 31 In context,
this definition seems to capture the relevant meaning. Congress is
granted the power to "further, advance, [or] encourage" the progress
of science. No controversy has arisen with respect to the meaning of
this particular term. The equation of "promote" with "encourage" is
131. 12 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 616. The illustrative uses are:
1515 BARCLAY Egloges IV. (1570) C vj/1 Such rascolde drames pro-
moted by Thais,. .Or by suche other newe forged Muses nine. 1526
Pilgr. Perf (W. de W. 1531) 12b, This gyfte expelleth all vyce, and
promoteth all vertue. 1577 HANMER Anc. Eccl. Hist. (1619) 236 The
Emperour. .went about to promote christian religion. 1644 DIGBY Nat.
Soul iv. §5. 390 All the causes and helpes that promote on its impotent
desires. 1698-9 (Mar. 8) Minute Bk. S.P.C.K, The Journal of the Hon-hi, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1703 J. TIPPER in Lett.
Lit. Men (Camden) 305 You will promote the Sale of it as much as
possibly you can. 1765 A. DICKSON Treat. Agric. (ed. 2) 79 Vegeta-
tion is promoted. .by communicating to the earth the food of plants,
and enlarging their pasture. 1849 MACAULAY Hist. Eng. i I. 191 It
could in no way promote the national interest. 1874 GREEN Short Hist.
ii. § 1.60 Commerce and trade were promoted by the justice and pol-
icy of the Kings. 1930 Publisher's Weekly 31 May 2732/2 The books
all to be individualized in appearance and fully promoted. 1965 Mel-
ody Maker 3 Apr. 7/3 With the group over here to promote their latest
recording,. .they could well make the chart. 1971 D. POTTrER Brit. Eliz.
Stamps x. 117 These packs are heavily promoted, with full-page col-
our advertisements in the national press. 1976 National Observer
(U.S.) 30 Oct. 9/3, I love chocolate-chip cookies, and I love to pro-
mote.
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also confirmed by the Copyright Act of 1790, which uses the word
"encourage" in its preface. 132
b. progress
Until recently, the term "Progress" has also been relatively un-
controversial. Although the core historical meaning of progress is
associated with movement, the context of the Intellectual Property
Clause suggests a related figurative meaning, expressed in the fol-
lowing definition: "[g]oing on, progression; course or process (of
action, events, narrative, time, etc.) in progress: proceeding, taking
place, happening."' 133 Thus, the "Progress of Science" would ordi-
narily be understood as involving advances in learning or the con-
tinuation of scientific activity. "To "promote the Progress of Sci-
ence" would be to encourage the advancement of science or to
encourage scientific activity. We could paraphrase the Clause then
by using the words "encouragement of learning." Indeed, the Copy-
right Act of 1790, was subtitled, "[a]n Act for the encouragement of
learning,"' 34 suggesting that the first Congress believed that the pro-
motion of the progress of science meant encouragement of learning,
and therefore, that to "promote the Progress" of a given activity was
to "encourage" that activity.
There is a subtle difference between the first idea, advancement,
and the second notion, activity. If the "Progress of Science" is un-
derstood as the advancement of learning, then we focus on the results
of scientific activity. If the progress of science is understood as
132. See Act of May 31, 1970, ch. 15.
133. 12 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 593. The illustrative uses are:
1432-50 tr. Higden (Rolls) I. 395 The auctor of this presente Cronicle
towchethe in his progresse other processe rather Wales then Englonde.
Ibid. VI. 353 Of the begynnynge, progresse, and ende [of] whom
[orig. de cujus initio, progressu, etfine] hit is to be advertisede [etc.].
1526 Pilgr. Perf (W. de W. 1531) 26 Of the iewes & theyr progresse
we may lerne. 1613 SHAKS. Hen. VII1, v. iii. 33 In all the Progresse
Both of my Life and Office, I haue labour'd. .that [etc.]. 1664 POWER
Exp. Philos. III. 155 This virtue decayes in progress of Time (as all
Odours do). 1785 REID Intell. Powers II. xxi, So rapid is the progress
of the thought. 1849 MACAULAY Hist. Eng. i I. 179 While these
changes were in progress. 1891 Speaker 2 May 534/1 To trace the pro-
gress of chemical knowledge and research from the earliest times.
Id.
134. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15.
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encouraging the activity itself, we focus on the process itself. This
subtle difference, however, would seem to cut very little interpretive
ice, as the normal assumption is that more scientific activity will lead
to more learning.
These common-sense definitions of progress have been chal-
lenged, however, by Malla Pollack, both in an article in the Nebraska
Law Review 135 and in this Symposium. 136 Pollack maintains that
"progress" meant "spread" and therefore that the "Progress of Sci-
ence" is equivalent to the "diffusion of science."' 137 Pollack's argu-
ment relies on evidence of usage in the framing era from the search-
able compilation of the Pennsylvania Gazette.' 38 It is difficult to
understand, however, how such evidence could be decisive on the
relevant question. Initially, there is a threshold problem for Pollack's
argument. Most of her evidence involves cases in which the term
"progress" has a geographic or spatial meaning, 139 but this usage is
most frequently associated with linear movement (from point A to B)
rather than spread in the sense of diffusion (from the center out-
wards). One might say that the beetle progressed from the center of
the table to the edge, but it would be odd, although not inconceiv-
able, to say that the spilled milked progressed to cover the whole ta-
ble.
There is a more fundamental problem with Pollack's argument.
Evidence that the primary or most frequent usage of "progress" in
the founding era was spatial or geographic does not answer the ques-
tion as to whether that was the use made by those who framed or rati-
fied the constitution. Pollack does not argue that the figurative usage
involving qualitative or quantitative advance, or the sense of taking
place or proceeding was not common at the time of the framing. The
Oxford English Dictionary provides examples of this usage from the
fifteenth through the nineteenth century. In addition, given that the
135. See Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80
NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2002) [hereinafter Pollack, Defining Pro-
gress].
136. See generally Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68 (chal-
lenging common sense definitions of progress).
137. See id. at 340, 376.
138. See Pollack, Defining Progress, supra note 135.
139. See Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68, at 340, 376 (defin-
ing the term "Progress").
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common-sense interpretation of the term "progress" involves a figu-
rative use, the prevalence of the underlying literal use only reinforces
the possibility that the term was used in the common figurative
sense. Finally, on Pollack's interpretation, the phrase "Progress of
Science" means something like "dissemination of knowledge" or
"dispersion of learning."' 140 The question naturally arises as to why
the Framers would not have chosen more felicitous language to ex-
press the idea of dispersion, especially given that the spatial sense of
"progress" connotes movement from one place to another. Thus, the
Oxford English Dictionary offers: "[t]he action of stepping or
marching forward or onward; onward march; journeying, travelling,
travel; a journey, an expedition."' 14 1 On Pollack's view, Congress is
not empowered to encourage learning to march forward. 142 Rather,
her theory is that Congress is given the power to encourage knowl-
edge to spread-a subtle, but in this case, crucial distinction.' 
43
c. science
This brings us to the final operative term, "Science." Because
the meaning of this term may prove crucial in Eldred and because the
140. See id. at 340, 375-77.
141. 12 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 592. The illustrations for this
definition are:
c1475 Partenay 3199 Off me the werre the Giaunt doth desire, Anon
shall I go hym Assail quikly. To thys forth-progresse Geffray made
redy. 1590 SPENSER F.Q. IIl. xi. 20 So forth they both yfere make their
progresse. 1616 R. C. Times' Whistle VI. 2599 It was my fortune with
.others. .One summers day a progresse for to goe Into the countrie.
1621 BURTON Anat. Mel. ii. ii. IV. (1651) 269 The most pleasant of all
outward pastimes, is. .to make a petty progress, a merry journey. 1678
BUNYAN (title) The Pilgrim's Progress from this world, to that which
is to come. 1745 P. THOMAS Jrnl. Anson's Voy. 160 The Officers and
People made a Progress round the Island. 1838 THIRWALL Greece V.
xl. 123 Their progress through the Persian provinces was a kind of tri-
umph.
Id.
142. See Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68, at 340. ("Congress
was granted power to pass only such copyright and patent statutes that promote
the dissemination of knowledge and technology to the public. Therefore, the
Clause is rightly called the 'Progress Clause,' because its core purpose is the
spread ... of knowledge and technology to all persons within the protection of
the Constitution.")
143. See id. (suggesting an alternative view of the definition of progress.)
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secondary literature has paid scant attention to this term, our explora-
tion of its meaning will proceed at a more deliberate pace. Initially,
we will investigate definitions and evidence of usage.
Consider each of the relevant definitions offered by the Oxford
English Dictionary:
" "The state or fact of knowing; knowledge or cogni-
zance of something specified or implied; also, with
wider reference, knowledge (more or less extensive)
as a personal attribute."'
144
" "Knowledge acquired by study; acquaintance with
or mastery of any department of learning." 1
45
144. 14 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 648. The illustrations are:
a1340 HAMPOLE Psalter Cant. 500 Aid thyngis deport fra [your]
mouth: for God of sciens is lord, and till him ere redyd the thoghtis.
c1374 CHAUCER Boeth. II. pr. vii. (1868) 59 Pe soule whiche Pat hap
in it self science of goode werkes [L. sibi mens bene conscia]. 1426
LYDG. De Guil. Pilgr. 2697 Therfor ye trewly ber the name Cherubin,
fful of scyence And of dyvyne sapyence. 1532 MORE Confut. Tindale
Wks. 361/2 Whereof saynt Paule cryeth hymself, 0 altitudo diuitia-
rum sapientie & scientie dei. 0 the heyght and depenes of the ryches
of the wysedome and scyence of god. 1601 SHAKS. All's Well V. iii.
103 Plutus himselfe,. .Hath not in natures mysterie more science, Then
I haue in this Ring. 1667 MILTON P.L. IX. 680 0 Sacred, Wise, and
Wisdom-giving Plant, Mother of Science. 1678 GALE Crt. Gentiles
IV. III. 36 Some of our Opponents resolve Gods certain prescience of
sin into the infinitude of his science. 1697 tr. Burgersaicius' Logic II.
xx. 99 The word science is either taken largely to signifie any cogni-
tion or true assent; or, strictly, a firm and infallible one; or, lastly, an
assent of propositions made known by the cause and effect. 1700
ROWE Amb. Step-Mother 11. ii. 852 What makes Gods divine But
Power and Science infinite. 1725 POPE Odyss. 1I. 198 For lo! my
words no fancy'd woes relate: I speak from science, and the voice is
Fate. 1728 CHAMBERS Cycl. s.v. Science, Divines suppose three kinds
of Science in God: The first, Science of mere Knowledge. .The sec-
ond, a Science of Vision. .The third, an intermediate Science. 1753
JOHNSON Adventurer No. 107 18 Life is not the object of Science:
we see a little, very little; and what is beyond we can only conjecture.
1882 SEELEY Nat. Relig. 260 Though we have not science of it [su-
pematuralism] yet we have probabilities or powerful presentiments.
Id.
145. Id. The illustrative uses are:
13. .E.E. Allit. P. B. 1289 Wyth alle Pe coyntyse Pat he cowpe. .De-
uised he [salomon] Pe vesselment,. .Wyth slyt of his ciences, his
souerayn to loue. 1390 GOWER Conf II. 82 And Heredot in his sci-
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" "Contradistinguished from art .... The distinction
as commonly apprehended is that a science (=) is
concerned with theoretic truth, and an art (=) with
methods for effecting certain results. Sometimes,
however, the term science is extended to denote a
department of practical work which depends on the
knowledge and conscious application of principles;
an art, on the other hand, being understood to re-
quire merely knowledge of traditional rules and skill
acquired by habit."'
146
" "In a more restricted sense: A branch of study
which is concerned either with a connected body of
ence Of metre, of rime and of cadence The ferste was of which men
note. c1400 Destr. Troy 5524 Epistaphus. .a discrete man of dedis,
dryuen into age, And a sad mon of sciens in the seuyn artis. c1440
Gesta Rom. xxxiv. 132 (Harl. MS.) No man myght be likenid to him
in no kynne sciens. 1456 SIR G. HAYE Law Arms (S.T.S.) 16 Clerkis
of hye science, the quhilkis had the grete dignities in haly kirk. c1475
Partenay 107 As rose is aboue al floures most fine So is science most
digne of worthynesse. 1538 BALE John Baptist in Har. Misc. (1744)
1. 105 You boast your selues moch, of ryghteousness and scyence.
1557 NORTH Gueuara's Diall Pr. II. xxx. (1568) 138b, The auncient
women were more esteamed for their sciences, then for their beauties.
1562 WINET Cert. Tractates I. 16 Giue Johne Knox and ze affirmis
zour selfis lauchful be ressoun of zour science [etc.]. 1738 GRAY
Propertius ii. 52 Be love my youth's pursuit, and science crown my
Age. 1781 COWPER Conversation 14 As alphabets in ivory employ,
Hour after hour, the yet unletter'd boy, Sorting and puzzling with a
deal of glee Those seeds of science call'd his A B C.
Id.
146. Id. at 649. The illustrations are:
1678 MOXON Mech. Dyalling 4 Though we may justly account Dyal-
ling originally a Science, yet. .it is now become to many of the Ingen-
ious no more difficult than an Art. 1712 BUDGELL Spect. No. 307 5
Without a proper temperament for the particular Art or Science which
he studies, his utmost Pains and Application. .will be to no purpose.
1796 KIRWAN Elem. Min. (ed. 2) 1. Pref. 11 Previous to the year 1780,
mineralogy, though tolerably understood by many as an art, could
scarce be deemed a Science. 1834 SOUTHEY Doctor cxx. (1862) 294
The medical profession. .was an art, in the worst sense of the word,
before it became a science, and long after it pretended to be a science
was little better than a craft. 1907 HODGES Elem. Photogr. 58 The de-
velopment of the photographic image is both an art and a science.
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demonstrated truths or with observed facts system-
atically classified and more or less colligated by be-
ing brought under general laws, and which includes
trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth
within its own domain.'
147
* "In modem use, often treated as synonymous with
'Natural and Physical Science', and thus restricted
to those branches of study that relate to the phenom-
ena of the material universe and their laws, some-
times with implied exclusion of pure mathematics.
This is now the dominant sense in ordinary use."'
148
Let us begin with this final definition. As noted above, the
modem reader of Article I, Section 8, is likely to find the association
147. Id. The illustrative uses are:
1725 WATTS Logic ii. ii. §9 The word science, is usually applied to a
whole body of regular or methodical observations or propositions,
.concerning any subject of speculation. 1794 HUTTON Philos. Light,
etc. 117 Philosophy must proceed in generalising those truths which
are the object of particular sciences. 1860 ABP. THOMSON Laws Th.
§131 (ed. 5) 281 Classification of the Sciences. Mathematics... As-
tronomy... Physics [etc.]. 1882 ADAMSON in Encycl. Brit. XIV. 781/2
It may be said that in all sciences there are implied clearly defined no-
tions, general statements orjudgments, and methodical proofs.
Id.
148. Id. The examples of usage are:
1867 W. G. WARD in Dubl. Rev. Apr. 255 note, We shall. .use the
word 'science' in the sense which Englishmen so commonly give to it;
as expressing physical and experimental science, to the exclusion of
theological and metaphysical. 1870 YEATS Nat. Hist. Comm. Introd.
14 An acquaintance with science or with the systematised knowledge
of matter and its properties. 1895 Educat. Rev. Sept. 25 Science-
teaching is nothing, unless, it brings the pupil in contact with nature.
1913 C. MACKENZIE Sinister St. I. II. vii. 253 Science is all the go
nowadays... And Science is what we want. Science and Religion.
1946 R. J. C. ATKINSON Field Archaeol. 12 One more problem
.remains to be mentioned, the problem of co-operation between ar-
chaeologists and workers in other sciences. 1955 Bull. Atomic Sci.
Apr. 141/1 Science has become a major source of the power of civi-
lized man. 1976 Norwich Mercury 17 Dec. 3/8 Second year prizes-
English,. .mathematics,. .science,. .history,. .geography,. .music. 1978
Nature 10 Aug. 522/1 Funds for lunar sample analysis have remained
roughly constant over the past few years and the programme has re-
ceived praise for the high quality of the science conducted.
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of "Science" with "Authors" and "Writings" odd. 149 Indeed, one
might assume that the term science belongs with the patent power,
whereas the term "Arts," useful or otherwise, might be more readily'
associated with the copyright power. But the reverse is the case.
The tendency of modem usage is to associate the term "science"
with the natural sciences, such as chemistry, physics, and biology.
These are understood as the "hard sciences" and as the exemplary or
paradigm cases of science. Even a systematic and formal body of
knowledge, such as geometry, mathematics, or symbolic logic, might
be thought to be science in only a loose or derivative sense. To the
extent this is a feature of modem usage, however, it does not con-
form to the understanding of the term "science" in the founding
era. 150 Rather, there is general agreement that science was usually
understood in a broader sense, so as to include knowledge, especially
systematic or grounded knowledge of enduring value.' 5' Thus, the
meanings of "learning" and "science" would be closely related.
One piece of evidence for this interpretation is found in the
Copyright Act of 1790, which was titled, "[a]n Act for the encour-
agement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times
therein mentioned."' 52 It is obvious that the title of the Act is in-
tended as a paraphrase of the Copyright Clause. For "promote the
Progress of Science," we read "the encouragement of learning." For
"securing to Authors," we read "securing ... the authors and proprie-
tors of such copies." For "Writings," we read "maps, charts, and
books." For "limited Times," we read "during the times therein
mentioned," i.e., an initial period of fourteen years and an additional
fourteen year renewal period. The closeness of the paraphrase
strongly suggests that the first Congress believed that "Science" and
"learning" were closely related in meaning.
The first Copyright Act supports the equation of "Science" and
"learning" in another way. The Act of 1790 protects three classes of
149. See also Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68, at 370-82.
(discussing the odd construction of the 'Progress Clause').
150. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at 15 n.4.
151. See Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68, at 376 ("'Science'
means 'knowledge' in an anachronistically broad sense.").
152. Act of May 31, 1970, ch. 15.
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writings: "maps, charts, and books."' 5 3 Maps are the product of the
science of geography, and charts are the product of the science of
navigation. In addition to these specialized writings, the statute en-
compassed "books", which were, and even in this internet era, still
are the primary vehicle for the transmission of learning and knowl-
edge. It would not be surprising to learn from historical research that
most published books in the framing era were nonfiction works con-
taining "knowledge" or "learning", that is, "science" in the broad
sense of that term that prevailed in the founding era.
There is very little exposition of the Copyright Clause in the
early cases. The most prominent case, Wheaton v. Peters, involved
the reports of Supreme Court cases, 154 but the definition of science
was not at stake in that case. Justice Thompson, who dissented in
Wheaton, wrote for the Circuit Court in Clayton v. Stone, 15 5 a case in
which the copyrightability of newspaper reports of market data
(pricecurrent reports) was at issue. Justice Thompson's opinion was
later quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Sel-
den.'56 The Court determined that the newspaper reports were not
"books" within the meaning of the statute, reasoning in part as fol-
lows:
In determining the true construction to be given to the act of
congress, it is proper to look at the Constitution of the
United States, to aid us in ascertaining the nature of the
property intended to be protected. Congress shall have
power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their writings and discoveries. Section 8, art.
1, Const. U. S. The act in question was passed in execution
of the power here given, and the object, therefore, was the
promotion of science; and it would certainly be a pretty ex-
traordinary view of the sciences to consider a daily or
weekly publication of the state of the market as falling
within any class of them. They are of a more fixed, perma-
nent, and durable character. The term 'science' cannot,
153. Id.
154. See generally Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834) (indi-
cating the lack of importance of the definition of science).
155. 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872).
156. 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879) (quoting the passage below in full).
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with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating
and fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price-current,
the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is of
mere temporary use. Although great praise may be due to
the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing
this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being re-
warded in this way: it must seek patronage and protection
from its utility to the public, and not as a work of science.
The title of the act of Congress is, 'for the encouragement
of learning,', and was not intended for the encouragement
of mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sci-157
ences ....
This passage provides an imperfect window into the early un-
derstanding of the meaning of the power to "promote of the Progress
of Science." The sciences, Justice Thompson wrote, "are of a more
fixed, permanent and durable character" than are newspapers or
market reports, "the subject-matter of which is daily changing, and is
of mere temporary use."' 158 The import of this passage is that science
is learning or knowledge of enduring value.
The original understanding of the aim of the Copyright Clause
was that Congress must aim at the encouragement of systematic
knowledge or learning of enduring value. The contemporary under-
standing is quite different. The modem gloss on the meaning of the
clause might be: "Congress shall have power to encourage the pro-
duction of creative works." The modem economic significance of
copyright is centered on the entertainment industry. Blockbuster
movies, hit records, and best-selling novels, not learned treatises,
navigational charts, and maps, are the stuff that has driven recent
copyright legislation.
C. A Restatement of the Interpretation
How then are we to interpret the words, "Congress shall have
power To promote the Progress of Science... by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ...Writ-
ings"? 159  Our investigation, thus far, suggests that a rough
157. Id. at 105 (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003).
158. Id. (quoting Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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restatement would be: "Congress shall have power to pursue the
goal of encouraging systematic knowledge and learning of enduring
value, but that power shall be exercised only by means of legislation
granting monopoly rights in the publication and dissemination of
books, maps, charts, and other learned writings, provided that the ex-
clusive rights may be granted only to the creators of such works and
provided that the exclusive rights granted shall be of a duration that
is bounded or restricted in comparison to the usual productive life of
authors." Notice that one virtue of the paraphrase is that the actual
language of the Intellectual Property Clause is an elegant and simple
expression that can be naturally read as capturing each and every
element of the paraphrase.
As we shall see, however, the proposed interpretation of the
Copyright Clause does not mesh well with all the features of modem
copyright legislation. Modem copyright legislation protects a variety
of works that appear, at first blush, unconnected with learning and
knowledge. Modem copyright legislation provides a term that is,
from the perspective of authors, practically unbounded and unre-
stricted in duration. We now turn our attention to the tension be-
tween the language and history of the Copyright Clause and contem-
porary copyright practice.
D. Promoting the Progress of Science: The Tensions with Modern
Doctrine and Practice
Our investigation of contemporary copyright doctrine can begin
with the Supreme Court's gloss on the term "Science." We then can
investigate the adequacy of that interpretation.
1. The "creativity" interpretation
The courts have given a most unusual meaning to the term "Sci-
ence." In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 160 the Supreme
Court equated the progress of science with "artistic creativity."' 6'
Here is the passage:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory mo-
nopoly.., reflects a balance of competing claims upon the
public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and
160. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
161. Id. at 156.
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rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. 1
62
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 163 science
is correlated with "the creative activity of authors."'164 This interpre-
tation of science fits well with contemporary copyright legislation,
which protects far more than "maps, charts, and books," extending
protection to artistic works of all sorts, including the visual arts and
sound recordings. 1
65
The Supreme Court has never advanced the "artistic creativity"
definition in the context of focused analysis of the term science, but
nonetheless these formulations have been influential. Moreover, the
modem scope of copyright protection, encompassing as it does the
visual arts and the performances of musical scores, would be under-
written if "Science" meant "creative art."
2. A critique of the creativity interpretation
When the Framers used the term "Science," did they mean artis-
tic creativity? Unless we learn something unexpected about usage in
the late eighteenth century, the answer is surely no. The broad sense
of "science" encompasses systematic knowledge and learning of all
forms, the natural and social sciences, the humanities, perhaps even
the principles of musical composition. But there is simply no evi-
dence that "art" and "science" were synonymous in the framing era.
Indeed, the term science is sometimes used precisely to distinguish
systematic knowledge from art. Recall that the Oxford English Dic-
tionary offered the following meaning of "science":
Contradistinguished from art .... The distinction as com-
monly apprehended is that a science.., is concerned with
theoretic truth, and an art... with methods for effecting
162. Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
526-27 (1994).
163. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
164. Id. at 546.
165. See 17 U.S.C.§ 102(a) (2000).
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certain results. Sometimes, however, the term science is
extended to denote a department of practical work which
depends on the knowledge and conscious application of
principles; an art, on the other hand, being understood to
require merely knowledge of traditional rules and skill ac-
quired by habit.' 
66
This is not a new usage. The examples offered by the editors of the
Oxford English Dictionary go back to before the framing era and ex-
tend after it. 167 Whatever the Framers meant by "Science," it strains
credulity to suppose that they meant artistic endeavor, artistic crea-
tivity, or, simply, creativity.
E. The Implications of Taking Science Seriously
Suppose we take "Science" seriously. What would be the impli-
cations for Congress's power?
1. Congress must aim to encourage systematic knowledge and
learning of enduring value
The first implication follows directly from the constitutional
text. Because Congress is granted the power to promote the progress
of science, and because science is "systematic knowledge or learning
of enduring value," it follows that Congress must aim at this end
when it adopts copyright legislation. Of course, legislation aimed at
promoting the progress of science may have other effects as well.
For example, the first Congress extended copyright protection to
books as a general class, and this may well have encouraged
166. 14 SIMPSON & WEINER, supra note 92, at 649. The illustrations are:
1678 MOXON Mech. Dyalling 4 Though we may justly account Dyal-
ling originally a Science, yet. it is now become to many of the Ingen-
ious no more difficult than an Art. 1712 BUDGELL Spect. No. 307 5
Without a proper temperament for the particular Art or Science which
he studies, his utmost Pains and Application. .will be to no purpose.
1796 KIRWAN Elem. Min. (ed. 2) 1. Pref. 11 Previous to the year 1780,
mineralogy, though tolerably understood by many as an art, could
scarce be deemed a Science. 1834 SOUTHEY Doctor cxx. (1862) 294
The medical profession. .was an art, in the worst sense of the word,
before it became a science, and long after it pretended to be a science
was little better than a craft. 1907 HODGES Elem. Photogr. 58 The de-
velopment of the photographic image is both an art and a science.
167. See id.
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novelists, as well as natural scientists and the authors of philosophi-
cal essays. Likewise, when Congress confers exclusive rights on au-
thors, that action may have the affect of providing financial support
to the authors' heirs and of allowing the heirs to preserve the artistic
integrity of the author's legacy by restricting the uses to which copy-
righted works may be put. Given that it is inevitable that a general
regime of copyright will have effects, good and ill, other than pro-
moting the progress of science, it follows that Congress need not ig-
nore these effects. The shape of copyright legislation may properly
be crafted so as to maximize the beneficial side effects of promoting
the progress of science and to minimize those effects that are harm-
ful.
What Congress may not do is make these collateral conse-
quences the chief object of copyright legislation. Thus, if the pri-
mary purpose of the CTEA was to enrich the proprietors of copy-
rights in preexisting works that were about to fall into the public
domain, then the CTEA is unconstitutional. What Congress must do
is consider the effect of copyright legislation on the progress of sci-
ence. Congress must ask the question, "If we enact this statute will it
encourage systematic knowledge and learning of enduring value?" If
the answer to that question is no, then the proposed statute may not
be enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause. 1
68
2. Congress may employ general categories when it creates
exclusive rights
If the Supreme Court construes the Copyright Clause in accord
with its plain meaning and the structure of Article I, Section 8, then
the Court must decide whether Congress may employ overinclusive
general categories when it classifies copyrightable writings. This
point is well illustrated by an argument that Scott Martin makes in
favor of the preamble interpretation of the "Power To promote the
Progress of Science" language. Martin argues:
If the phrase created the strict limitation which opponents to
term extension pretend that it does, Congress would not
have the authority to protect any works that are not "useful"
arts. The courts have, however, correctly concluded that,
168. See generally Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 101-02 (discussing
judicial review of congressional motives).
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"Congress need not 'require that each copyrighted work be
shown to promote the useful arts .... ' That being so, we
cannot accept... [the] argument that the introductory lan-
guage of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on Con-
gressional power."
' 169
Martin is surely wrong to reach the conclusion that rejecting the hor-
tatory-preamble interpretation would entail the conclusion that each
and every copyrighted work must promote the progress of science
(the "useful Arts" are, of course, relevant to the patent power rather
than the copyright power). Rather, the appropriate conclusion is that
the specification of means in the second part of the Copyright Clause
is naturally understood as permitting Congress to protect broad cate-
gories of works. The proper question is whether protection of the
category promotes the progress of science. In this context, as in
every other, the use of general categories entails both underinclusion
and overinclusion. Thus, the Act of 1790 protected "charts, maps,
and books."' 7 0 Protecting these general categories promotes the pro-
gress of science, even though some maps, some charts, and some
books do not serve and may well impede this objective. Even an in-
competent cartographer could copyright his maps.
In this regard, it is worth pausing to compare patent with copy-
right. The Patent Clause requires Congress to promote the progress
of the useful arts.' 71 When Congress exercised this power, Congress
chose a statutory regime that requires that each and every patented
article have "utility." In theory, every patent satisfies the require-
ment that patent legislation "promote the progress of the useful
arts.'172 When Congress exercised the copyright power it chose a
different path, a writing could be copyrighted if it were a book, chart,
or map, even if it was not scientific in character. Of course, in the
framing era, writings in these categories were likely to contribute to
learning and knowledge. Maps and charts advanced geography, and
Steinberg had yet to paint his famous New Yorker's view of the
world. I have not examined the catalog of late eighteenth century li-
braries, but I would not be surprised to find that learned works, not
169. Martin, supra note 16, at 299 (quoting Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d
102, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
170. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
172. Id.
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romance or mystery novels, comprised the majority of most collec-
tions with which the Framers were familiar. It could have been oth-
erwise, of course. Congress might have imposed a "scientific char-
acter" requirement in the first Copyright Act. But simply because
Congress chose from the beginning to protect general categories of
writings in order to promote the progress of science, it does not fol-
low that Congress may now ignore its constitutional obligation to
promote systematic knowledge and learning of enduring value when
it legislates pursuant to the Copyright Clause. Congress may choose
between the categorical approach of copyright and the case-by-case
approach of patent, but this does not entail that Congress may choose
to ignore "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.
' 173
The constitutional question-whether and to what extent Con-
gress may employ overinclusive general categories when it classifies
copyrightable writing-has two textual dimensions. First, when
Congress decides to protect a general category of work, it must aim
at the promotion of science. Second, the category of work must be
fairly describable as "Writings." The Supreme Court has never
squarely faced the question as to what limits these two requirements
impose on Congress's power to grant copyright protection to particu-
lar categories for works. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.,174 Justice Holmes decided that a circus advertisement consti-
tuted a "pictorial illustration" for the purposes of the copyright stat-
ute, but he did not discuss the constitutional question.' 75 The first
Justice Harlan, in his dissent joined by Justice McKenna, did reach
that question, stating "[t]he clause of the Constitution giving Con-
gress power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective works and discoveries, does not, as I think,
embrace a mere advertisement of a circus."
176
Justice Douglas recognized the problem posed by the lack of
precedent in his opinion, joined by Justice Black, in Mazer v.
Stein. 177 His discussion is worth quoting in full:
173. Id.
174. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
175. See id. at 248-52.
176. Id. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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An important constitutional question underlies this case-a
question which was stirred on oral argument but not treated
in the briefs. It is whether these statuettes of dancing fig-
ures may be copyrighted. Congress has provided that
"works of art", "models or designs for works of art", and
"reproductions of a work of art" may be copyrighted (17
U.S.C § 5); and the Court holds that these statuettes are in-
cluded in the words "works of art". But may statuettes be
granted the monopoly of the copyright?
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings .... " The power is thus
circumscribed: it allows a monopoly to be granted only to
"authors" for their "writings." Is a sculptor an "author" and
is his statue a "writing" within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion? We have never decided the question.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
held that a photograph could be copyrighted.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23
S.Ct. 298, held that chromolithographs to be used as adver-
tisements for a circus were "pictorial illustrations" within
the meaning of the copyright laws. Broad language was
used in the latter case, ". . . a very modest grade of art has
in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in
the words of the act." 188 U.S., at page 250. But the con-
stitutional range of the meaning of "writings" in the field of
art was not in issue either in the Bleistein case nor in Wool-
worth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, recently
here on a writ for certiorari limited to a question of dam-
ages.
At times the Court has on its own initiative considered and
decided constitutional issues not raised, argued, or briefed
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by the parties. Such, for example, was the case of Conti-
nental Bank v. Rock Island R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 667, in
which the Court decided the constitutionality of § 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act [ 1I U.S.C.A. § 205] though the question
was not noticed by any party. We could do the same here
and decide the question here and now. This case, however,
is not a pressing one, there being no urgency for a decision.
Moreover, the constitutional materials are quite meager (see
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution, 17 Geo. L.J. 109 (1929)); and much re-
search is needed.
The interests involved in the category of "works of art," as
used in the copyright law, are considerable. The Copyright
Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles
which have been copyrighted-statuettes, book ends,
clocks, lamps, door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands,
chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers,
fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays. Perhaps these are all
"writings" in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least,
they are not obviously so. It is time that we came to the
problem full face. I would accordingly put the case down
for reargument. 1
78
Justice Douglas' point applies with equal force in the context of
Eldred v. Ashcroft. The case was argued below in the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. Given that Circuit's decision in Schnapper v.
Foley,179 the plaintiffs were compelled to embrace the proposition
that the "Progress of Science" power is a mere hortatory preface, 180
and hence the record and arguments in Eldred do not focus on the
meaning of this provision, the construction of which may determine
the outcome of the case.
F. Eldred v. Ashcroft and the Copyright Clause
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court will have the opportu-
nity, for the first time in its modem history, to consider in depth the
178. Id. at219-21.
179. 667 F.2d 102 (1981).
180. See id. at 112.
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meaning of the Copyright Clause. Of course, the Court may not
avail itself of this opportunity. The Court may resolve the case
solely on First Amendment grounds, or avoid the Copyright Clause
issues through a variety of means. But if the Court does squarely
face the meaning of the Copyright Clause, it will be presented with a
daunting task. Because the meaning of the key phrases, "the pro-
gress of science," "to authors," "limited times," etc., has not received
an authoritative judicial construction, copyright legislation has been
limited mostly by Congress's perception of the public interest and
the lobbying of copyright stakeholders. The difficulty the court faces
is that a great deal of the modem copyright regime may not be sus-
tainable if the Court takes seriously the text and history of the Copy-
right Clause. The worst case scenario might be a decision that
strikes down the CTEA, calls into question the validity of the life-
time-plus-50-years term of the 1976 Act, and casts doubt on the
copyrightability of sound recordings of musical works. In the small
world of copyright law, this would be a constitutional revolution (or
restoration) as significant as that begun by the Supreme Court in its
1995 decision in United States v. Lopez.181
III. A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES
The discussion that follows offers a very selective reader's guide
to the contributions to this Symposium. The guide is organized
around the fundamental issues that the Supreme Court will face in
Eldred v. Ashcroft. We begin with the question whether Congress
had power to pass the CTEA pursuant to the Copyright Clause and
then proceed to the question whether the enactment violates the First
Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
A. The Power Question
Recall the first question on which certiorari was granted: "Did
the D.C. Circuit err in holding that Congress has the power under the
Copyright Clause to extend retroactively the term of existing copy-
rights?"'' 8 2 Our exploration of this question can begin with the ab-
stract question, "What level of scrutiny should the Supreme Court
apply to the CTEA?" We then proceed to the question whether the
181. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
182. Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at i.
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CTEA is invalid because it fails to promote the progress of science.
Finally, we consider whether the CTEA violates the requirement that
copyrights be granted only for limited times.
1. What tier of scrutiny shall apply
Although Congress is obligated to remain faithful to the Consti-
tution, the focus of most American constitutional discourse is on ju-
dicial enforcement of the Constitution. This raises questions about
deference. Even if a court believes that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional power, that belief need not entail the conclusion that
the statute in question shall be struck down. The court might con-
clude that it should not substitute its judgment for that of Congress,
so long as Congress had a reasonable belief that it was acting consti-
tutionally. Modem constitutional doctrine involves a thicket of stan-
dards of judicial review, ranging from strict scrutiny through inter-
mediate scrutiny meandering past rational-basis plus scrutiny and
rational-basis scrutiny and terminating in political questions, where
the court defers entirely to the judgment made by Congress.' 83
Thus, the court in Eldred may be required to address the ques-
tion as to what level of scrutiny applies to the question of whether
the CTEA is authorized by the Copyright Clause. Richard Epstein's
contribution to the Symposium, The Dubious Constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, offers a sophisticated analysis of the
issue, observing that rational basis scrutiny would likely result in up-
holding the CTEA, 184 but argues that either intermediate scrutiny or
strict scrutiny would result in invalidation of the act.185 Malla Pol-
lack also considers these issues in her piece, Dealing with Old Father
William, Or Moving from Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doc-
trine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension
Act. 186 Dennis Karjala focuses on this issue in Judicial Review of
Copyright Term Extension Legislation,' 87 and Dan Coenen and Paul
183. For a discussion of levels of scrutiny, see generally Laurence H. Tribe
& Michael Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1057 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitu-
tional Interpretation 72 B.U. L. REv. 699 (1992).
184. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 129-33.
185. See id.
186. See Pollack, Progress Clause Review, supra note 68.
187. See Karjala, supra note 22.
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Heald investigate the same themes in the form of a dialogue in their
essay, Mens/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law. Eldred v. Ashcroft in
One Act. 188
What level of scrutiny should be employed? Epstein argues that
the language of the clause suggests intermediate scrutiny. The fact
that the Copyright Clause sets forth both the means and the ends sug-
gests that the latter must be "reasonably related" to the former.'8 9
Epstein then argues for a more radical conclusion, that rational basis
scrutiny is never appropriate because it undermines the fundamental
goal of the constitution, the creation of a system of limited govern-
ment. 9 Turning his attention to the Supreme Court's limited treat-
ment of the issue, Epstein concludes that the leading case, Graham v.
John Deere,19 1 provides no definitive answer.192  After a brief
analysis of the commerce clauses cases, 193 and especially the effect
of United States v. Lopez, 194 Epstein turns to the neglected decision
in Evans v. Jordan,195 in which Justice Marshall, riding circuit, and
Justice Bushrod Washington, speaking for the Supreme Court, up-
held a private law creating an additional fourteen year term for an
expired patent that had fallen into the public domain. 196 Epstein ar-
gues that what is now called "rational basis scrutiny" is implicit in
Evans, implying that the Congress has plenary power under the Intel-
lectual Property Clause. 197 Epstein's argument may have moved too
quickly, however. If the primary limitation on terms is provided by
the phrase "limited Times," then a good argument can be made that
the private bill at issue in Evans v. Jordan should survive heightened
scrutiny. The term granted in Evans v. Jordan was limited in two
substantial senses: (1) their term was for a brief period, fourteen
years, and (2) Congress's adjustment of a single term on an ad hoc
basis does not make copyright terms uncertain or indefinite from the
188. See Coenen & Heald, supra note 71.
189. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 133-35.
190. See id. at 135.
191. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
192. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 135-38.
193. See id. at 138-48.
194. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
195. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815).
196. Id. at204.
197. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 144.
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point of view of the public, precisely because such private bills are
exceedingly rare.'
98
When it comes to McClurg v. Kingsland,199 Epstein convinc-
ingly demonstrates that the use of the word "plenary" in a decision
upholding some retroactive changes in the patent regime should not
be read to support the conclusion that Congress's intellectual prop-
erty power is without any internal limits. 20 Ultimately, Epstein
makes a convincing case that the cases require rational basis scru-
tiny, but is unable to show that they require more.
For Epstein, the keystone of the case against the CTEA is nei-
ther the text of the Intellectual Property Clause nor the cases; it is in-
stead a set of fundamental premises about the purpose of govern-
ment. Given his Lockean framework, the real infirmity of the CTEA
is that it "looks like a massive giveaway of public domain resources
for private use."20' As Epstein succinctly summarizes the point,
"[g]iveaways are bad business."20 2 Epstein may be right, but his
constitutional theory is controversial, and the fact that the CTEA is
special-interest legislation that takes from the public to give to the
proprietors of existing copyrights, is unlikely to be cited by the Su-
preme Court as the ultimate foundation for an opinion striking down
the Act.
A different approach to the levels of review problem might fo-
cus on the text of the Copyright Clause itself. Because the Clause
specifies both an end (the power grant) and a means (its specifica-
tion), it might be argued that the Copyright Clause itself contem-
plates that Congress should be especially careful about the relation-
ship between means and ends. Given that the courts employ
heightened means-ends scrutiny in other contexts, it would seem to
follow that heightened scrutiny of some form should apply in this
context. Indeed, it might be argued that the Copyright Clause should
not be pigeon-holed into one of the levels of scrutiny developed in
198. It would be a different case if Congress were to do this on a regular ba-
sis. If Congress were to engage in a systematic practice of renewing copy-
rights or patents that had expired by private bill, that practice might exceed
Congress's power under the Intellectual Property Clause.
199. See 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
200. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 147.
201. Id. at 128.
202. See id. at 157.
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the context of the Equal Protection Clause, but rather should be ex-
amined on its own terms, with the contours of scrutiny allowed to
evolve to fit the purposes of the Clause on a case-by-case basis.
2. Does the CTEA promote the progress of science
a. retroactivity and incentives
Can a retroactive extension of copyright promote the progress of
science? Since retroactive extensions apply only to works that have
already been created, the common sense answer would seem to be
no. Scott Martin, however, advances four points in support of his
claim to the contrary. Martin's first argument is "the Copyright
Clause is aimed at promoting the progress of science and useful arts.
As such, an extended term of protection for existing works promotes
the creation of new works." 203 The substance of Martin's argument
is that an extension of copyright forces competitors to produce new
works, rather than simply reusing works that are in the public
domain.20 4 This is an interesting claim, but Martin does not attempt
to explain how the economics of this incentive might work.20 5
Martin's second argument is that retroactive extensions encour-
age copyright owners to preserve and restore copyright works.
20 6
This point is contested, but it is possible that Congress might rea-
sonably have believed that copyright owners would be encouraged to
invest in the restoration and digitalization of older works by an ex-
tension of copyright term. What is not so clear is how this relates to
the constitutional goal promotion of the progress of science? If the
Constitution requires that Congress aim at the development of
203. Martin supra note 16, at 292.
204. See id.
205. The fact that a potential publisher cannot invest in public domain works
does not automatically mean that capital will flow to the creation of new
works. Rather, one would assume that capital will flow to whatever is the
most attractive investment opportunity. Of course, it might be the case that the
next best investment is in the creation of new works, but it might not. Notice
that if there is such an effect on investment from precluding public domain
publishing, the same effect could occur from any other law that deprived inves-
tors of a particular class of profitable opportunities. Thus, if Congress prohib-
its the manufacture of large sport utility vehicles, capital could flow to the
creation of new books, movies, or recordings, assuming the creation of new
works was the most profitable avenue for investment.
206. See Martin supra note 16, at 272-75.
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learning and knowledge, it is not clear that these incentives for re-
storing films or sound recordings serve that end.2 °7
Wendy Gordon addresses this argument in her essay, Authors,
Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross. She frames
her argument in terms of creativity, arguing that "the retrospective
copyright term extension helps only noncreative copiers., 20 ' Film
restoration does not produce new creative works. How then does
such restoration promote the progress of science? 20 9 If science does
mean "artistic creativity," then Gordon has demonstrated that retro-
activity does not promote the progress of science. If science means
systematic learning or knowledge of enduring value, then the
connection between retroactivity and the progress of science is even
more tenuous.
Dan Coenen and Paul Heald note yet another problem with the
film preservation argument. The means are not proportionate to the
ends.210 If film preservation is the goal, then a special restoration
right (e.g., a ten-year exclusive term for the first party to restore the
film) will achieve the end at a reasonable cost.2 11 The CTEA extends
all copyrights, even those of works that require no preservation at all.
Not only is the CTEA over-inclusive, it is also under-inclusive in this
regard. Many films in need of preservation are not commercially ex-
ploitable; their preservation would require some other measure, such
as a direct financial incentive. If film preservation is the end, then
207. It might be argued that film restoration promotes the progress of sys-
tematic knowledge and learning concerning the history of film. Similarly, it
might be argued that Congress could promote the progress of science by pre-
serving historic buildings or archeological sites. The difficulty is that the
means, preservation of an object of study, are not those specified by the copy-
right clause, the encouragement of learned writings.
208. See Wendy Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading
Gold for Dross, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 159, 163-64, 188-89 (2002).
209. See Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 102 ("Let's say you could earn a
ten-year exclusive right to show a film if you really saved it from the dustbin.
That statute would be constitutional because a law that provides genuine incen-
tives to preserve fading art should not be a problem under the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause.").
210. Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 104-05; see also Pollack, Progress
Clause Review, supra note 68, at 382. ("Constitutionality should require both a
tight fit and a tight supporting record.").
211. See Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 103-04.
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the CTEA would surely fail any "congruence and proportionality"
test.
21 2
Martin's third argument is that retroactive extension promotes
the progress of science by allowing the United States to adhere to in-
ternational colyright treaties and to protect U.S. copyrights
internationally. 13 Martin's supporting arguments in favor of this
claim are very thin indeed. He provides no reason to believe that
retroactive extensions are necessary for this purpose. The argument
that he does offer, that producers will be "discouraged from hiring
American creators in favor of hiring European creators ' 214 is
obviously an argument in favor of prospective increases in terms.
Dan Coenen and Paul Heald consider a variation of the argu-
ment, posing the question whether "Congress can grant gratuitous
copyright extensions to impose our foreign relations., 21 5 They note
that Missouri v. Holland216 establishes that Congress can pass legis-
lation to fulfill treaty obligations under the necessary and proper
clause, even if no other independent grant of power supports the ac-
tion."' Indeed, if the CTEA were required to fulfill a treaty obliga-
tion, a good case could be made that this would underwrite its consti-
tutionality, but even the proponents of the CTEA have not been able
to demonstrate that its provisions are required by treaty.
Sheila Perlmutter's essay, Participation in the International
Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science
and the Useful Arts,218 also argues that the CTEA is justified by har-
monization with international copyright standards. 219 She notes that
harmonization reduces the transactional costs of licensing and distri-
bution agreements, 220 and that harmonization reduces the uncertainty
that would otherwise result from indeterminate choice of law
212. See id. at 104; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1977).
213. See Martin, supra note 16, at 272-75.
214. 1d. at 295.
215. Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 104.
216. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
217. See Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 105.
218. See Shiela Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright Sys-
tem as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 336 (2002).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 328.
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standards. 22 1 Although Perlmutter's argument is persuasive when
considered in the abstract, the particular context of the CTEA is more
difficult. Rather, Perlmutter's strategy is revealed in the following
passage: "As a practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for
the United States to play a leadership role [in international copyright
policy] if each individual element in each negotiation had to inde-
pendently promote the progress of science in order to make the im-
plementing legislation constitutional. 222  In particular, Perlmutter
argues that retroactivity is a key feature of international copyright
22treaties. 223 If this argument is correct, then Perlmutter's argument
suggests that an unconstitutional CTEA might be resurrected via
treaty. As it stands, the CTEA does not fulfill any existing treaty ob-
ligation.
Martin's fourth and final argument is that the application of term
extension encourages artists, because it offers them the assurance
that "existing works will not be treated inferiorly." 224  Wendy
Gordon also addresses this argument in her essay. 225 Obviously, the
argument cannot apply to works already in existence. As Gordon
notes, the argument depends on a number of premises, including the
supposition that authors will interpret the CTEA "as a sort of guaran-
tee that Congress will continue to extend copyright retroactively if
technology or other factors make copyrights less profitable to ex-
ploit. ' 226  Quite clearly, the CTEA can offer no such assurance.
Congress might, at some future date, give new works greater protec-
tion than that offered by the CTEA. Nothing in the CTEA requires
that future copyright legislation be applied retroactively, and it is not
clear that Congress has the constitutional power to bind future Con-
gresses in this way. Therefore, the argument must be that the CTEA,
by continuing the pattern of retroactive extension, will make authors
believe that it is more likely that Congress will act this way in the fu-
ture. There are obviously empirical questions here that are, at the
least, controversial. One might wonder whether any author will ever
think about this issue, absent a concrete proposal for the extension of
221. See id.
222. Id. at 332.
223. See id.
224. Martin, supra note 16, at 296-97.
225. See Gordon, supra note 208, at 178-18 1.
226. Id. at 179.
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copyright. If such a proposal is on the table, it either will or will not
include retroactive extensions. If it does include retroactivity, then it
seems doubtful that the CTEA will add much assurance. If it does
not, then the lack of confidence is unlikely to be cured by the CTEA.
Most tellingly, the argument operates only with respect to some fu-
ture extension of copyright beyond the lifetime-plus-70-year term of
the CTEA. The discounted present value of the extension from fifty
to seventy years is already de minimis; further extensions from sev-
enty years to some longer period will add virtually nothing to the
present value of a copyright. In sum, Martin's fourth argument is en-
tirely unpersuasive.
Gordon raises another objection to Martin's argument. The
guarantee of future retroactivity argument assumes that Congress
will continue to extend copyright terms in the future.227 But a con-
tinued pattern of future increases would itself raise questions about
Congress's adherence to the "limited Times" requirement. As noted
in this Essay, the incentives provided by such far distant and specula-
tive royalties are likely to be very weak indeed.228
Edward Samuels offers a different set of arguments in support of
retroactivity in his essay, The Public Domain Revisited.229
Samuels's first argument is that the retroactivity argument entails
that the 1976 Act was also unconstitutional, and therefore that the
United States would be in violation of the Berne Treaty. 23 ° It is dif-
ficult to take this argument seriously. Setting aside the question
whether the treaty power would support the 1976 Act if it were re-
quired to fulfill a treaty obligation, it seems obvious that Congress
could easily fulfill the obligations of the Berne Treaty by a statute
that operated only prospectively. Moreover, the question whether
the prospective increase in terms in the 1976 Act is severable from
the retroactive increase would be quite different than the analogous
question under the CTEA given the requirements of the treaty.
Samuels then lists a number of other retroactive extensions that
might fail given petitioners' argument.2 3' Of course, this is not, by
227. See id. at 179-81.
228. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.b.
229. See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 389 (2002).
230. See id. at 404.
231. See id. at 400-05
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itself, an argument for constitutionality. Rather, it is an argument
that the constitutional prohibition on retroactive extensions has far-
reaching implications, which may, as a practical matter, lead to
harmful side-effects. Samuels then argues that "the promotion of
science and useful arts is allied with, not opposed to, the interests of
copyright owners." 232 The general evidence he cites for this proposi-
tion, however, does not lead to the conclusion that retroactive exten-
sions do promote the progress of science. Indeed, it is difficult to
fathom what point Samuels was attempting to make.
The next step in Samuels's argument is his observation that the
petitioners' retroactivity theory "would not only decide... [Eldred]
but it would also frame the issue in practically every other area of
copyright., 233 Although this is an exaggeration, there can be no
doubt that the Supreme Court's adoption of petitioners' retroactivity
theory in Eldred would indeed have far-reaching implications.
Samuels continues by claiming that the retroactivity theory is
unacceptable because it lacks a stopping point: "It would bar Con-
gress from making any adjustments in the terms of existing copy-
rights." 234 If this were true, it would not follow that Congress does
have such a power. Some further constitutional argument would be
required to establish that. Moreover, the retroactivity argument does
have a built-in limit on its implications for Congress's power to
make adjustments in existing copyright terms-such adjustments
would be constitutional whenever the evidence supported Congress's
determination that the adjustment would promote the progress of sci-
ence.
Samuels is on stronger ground when he argues that the Act of
1790 had a retroactive effect.235 As Samuels observes, retroactive
extensions were included in the Acts of 1831, 1909, and 1976.236
Does this longstanding historical practice settle the constitutional
question? Petitioners in Eldred argue that the 1790 Act did not ret-
roactively extend copyright, because it created only "new rights." 237
The Solicitor General responds that Thomas Jefferson signed
232. Id. at 404.
233. Id. at 405.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 409-411.
236. See id. at 411-14.
237. Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at 28.
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retroactive patent extensions in 1808 and 1809.238 Likewise, the So-
licitor General's brief notes that James Madison signed yet another
extension in 1815.239 Moreover, the Solicitor General argues that the
early decisions in Evans v. Robinson 24 and Evans v. Jordan24 1 sup-
port the view that Congress may retroactively extend the term of pat-
ents, and by implication, of copyrights as well.242
Relative to the 1790 Act, petitioners argue that its retroactivity is
distinguishable from subsequent retroactive extensions on the ground
that the 1790 Act involved "the need ... to address fundamental is-
sues of transition" 243 from the earlier state law regimes. But every
time a retroactive extension is paired with a prospective one, the ret-
roactivity can reasonably be characterized as a transition rule.244 In-
deed, the most obvious explanation for most of the retroactive exten-
sions of copyright terms is that they actually were transition rules,
aimed at fair treatment of the works created before and after the ef-
fective date of the legislation and avoiding the problem of works, the
creation, publication, or registration of which might be delayed in
order to take advantage of the new regime. In the case of the 1831,
1909, and 1976 revisions, these explanations ring true.
Can the CTEA's retroactive extension of copyright terms by
twenty years be viewed as a transition rule? The answer to this ques-
tion depends on whether one looks only at the surface manifestations
of the legislative process or digs deep into the political realities that
lead to the emergence of the CTEA. A surface view supports the
idea that the CTEA's retroactive extension is a transition rule, pre-
serving fairness and avoiding holdbacks of works until after the ef-
fective date of the legislation. A deeper excavation seems likely to
reveal that the retroactive extensions provided the real impetus for
238. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 73, at 15 (because Jefferson was
in France during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution of 1789, the
significance of this is uncertain).
239. See id. at 15-16.
240. 8 F. Cas. 886 (C.C.D. Md. 1813) (No. 4,571), affd, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
454 (1818).
241. 8 F. Cas. 872 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564), af'd, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
199 (1815).
242. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 73, at 14.
243. Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at 29.
244. A similar point is made by the Solicitor General. See Brief for Respon-
dent, supra note 73, at 17.
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the CTEA, and the prospective extensions were more window dress-
ing than they were the substance of the Act. The retroactive exten-
sion of the CTEA was worth billions to those who lobbied for its
passage; the value of the prospective extensions is dwarfed in com-
parison, because the income the prospective extensions generate
would be at least twenty years into the future. The Supreme Court
may well be reluctant to look beneath the surface of the CTEA's leg-
islative history, but if it does, the Court would be unlikely to con-
clude that the Act's retroactive provisions are saved because they are
mere transition rules.
Although the retroactivity debate is already well developed, two
points are not extensively discussed in the literature. First, the retro-
activity debate takes on a different shape if it is placed in the context
of the original meaning of "Science." What effect do retroactive ex-
tensions have on learned works? For example, classic books in the
humanities and social sciences are frequently the source of derivative
works such as annotated editions. Such derivative works can only be
prepared without a license when the original enters the public
domain. John Stuart Mill's 241 On Liberty246 was first published in
1859247 and under the Copyright Act of 1831, it would have entered
the public domain in 1901. 2 48 Inexpensive classroom editions with
scholarly annotations could be prepared as of that date. By way of
contrast, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice was first published in
1971. Professor Rawls is still alive, and, as of this writing, the earli-
est date upon which A Theory of Justice 249 could enter the public
domain would be 2072, one-hundred and one years after its creation.
It is conceivable that the date could be pushed out until the twenty-
second century.
Moreover, many scholarly articles have no direct economic
value to their authors at any time. The only effect of longer terms
upon such works is to increase the transaction costs of obtaining
245. See JOHN STUART MILL, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/m/milljs.htm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2002).
246. JOHN STUART MILL, 'ON LIBERTY' AND OTHER WRITINGS (Stefan Col-
lini ed., 1989).
247. See MILL, supra note 245.
248. John Stuart Mill died in 1873. See id. Under the CTEA, ON LIBERTY
would have entered the public domain in 1943.
249. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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permission to republish the work. Such transaction costs may be
considerable, especially if the scientific author retained the copyright
and it has now passed unnoticed with the author's residual estate,
perhaps to several heirs. Estate planners are likely to take care to
preserve unity of the power of control for popular works that have
discernable economic value at the time the author dies, but this is
unlikely to occur in the case of scientific works. I do not mean to
suggest these considerations establish that the CTEA would impede
the progress of science; surely more analysis would be required to
reach that conclusion. Rather, my point is that Congress does not
seem to have considered the encouragement of systematic knowledge
and learning at all in its deliberations over the CTEA.
Second, the retroactivity debate should be framed in light of the
constitutional prohibition on terms that are not "limited." If limited
means fixed, certain, or definite, then retroactivity is problematic.
Recall Martin's argument that the application of term extension en-
courages artists, because it offers them the assurance that "existing
works will not be treated inferiorly" than recently created works.
250
The very certainty that Martin argues will encourage authors results
in uncertainty for users of the public domain. No one can reliably
plan to prepare derivative works so long as Congress might extend
the term of copyright. To the extent that the incentive for authors is
significant, the disincentive for users of the public domain is also
significant.
b. economic analysis of author's incentives
One natural approach to the question whether the CTEA's pro-
spective extension of copyright terms promotes the progress of sci-
ence is to use the methods of economics. Avishalom Tor and Dotan
Oliar offer a sophisticated example of this approach in their article,
Incentives to Create Under a "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Du-
ration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v.
Ashcroft. Before examining their argument, some very basic points
should be mentioned.
A simple economic model of copyright terms and authors' in-
centives begins with the notion of expected value. Take a very sim-
ple case. Suppose that copyright law provides a fixed fifty-six year
250. Martin, supra note 16, at 296.
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term, and further suppose that a given work will produce royalties of
$1000 at the end of the first year, with royalties declining by 1% per
year. If the author were deciding at the beginning of the first year
whether to create the work,25' the author would add the discounted
present value of the payments that would be received in each addi-
tional year. In order to calculate a discounted present value, we must
assume a discount rate. Let us suppose the discount rate is 5%.
Thus, a payment of $1000 at the end of year one has a discounted
present value of $952.38, the amount that would yield $1000 if it
were placed in a savings account bearing simple annual interest of
5%. The following table represents the discounted value of years
one through five and years fifty-two through fifty-six, with years six
through fifty-one omitted.
Table 5: Discounted Value of Royalty Payments
Cumulative
Year Royalty Present Value Discounted PresentValue
I $ 1,000.00 $ 952.38 $ 952.38
2 $ 990.00 $ 897.96 $ 1,850.34
3 $ 980.10 $ 846.65 $ 2,696.99
4 $ 970.30 $ 798.27 $ 3,495.25
5 $ 960.60 $ 752.65 $ 4,247.91
6 through 50
51 $ 605.01 $ 50.25 $ 15,837.60
52 $ 598.96 $ 47.38 $ 15,884.97
53 $ 592.97 $ 44.67 $ 15,929.64
54 $ 587.04 $ 42.12 $ 15,971.76
55 $ 581.17 $ 39.71 $ 16,011.47
56 $ 575.35 $ 37.44 $ 16,048.91
The first column represents the year at the end of which the royalty is
paid. The second column represents the royalty paid in that year.
The third column represents the discounted present value of that
year's payment. The fourth column represents the total discounted
present value of all of the payments up to and including the year in
251. For simplicity, we assume that creation happens instantly.
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the first column. Thus, at the end of fifty-six years, the discounted
present value of the income stream produced by the work is
$16,048.91. What would happen to this amount if another twenty
years were added to the copyright, for a total of seventy-six years?
The total discounted present value would increase to $16,476.24,
adding $427.33, representing a 2.6% increase in the amount of com-
pensation. If we repeat this experiment again, adding another twenty
years to the term for a total of ninety-six years, we get a total of
$16,607.96, or an increase of $131.73 in discounted present value
over a seventy-six year term, equivalent to a 0.8% increase.
In other words, as terms grow longer, the relative contribution
that a renewal term adds to the authors' economic incentive grows
smaller. Terms longer than about seventy years produce very little
economic inventive, even if they are very long indeed. In our exam-
ple, additional years past year 208 are virtually worthless in terms of
discounted present value.252 So far, this is simple accounting, and
completely uncontroversial. 53
Tor and Oliar use the methods of behavioral economics to
evaluate the choice between copyright terms for a fixed number of
years and copyright terms for the life of the author plus an additional
fixed period. 4 They begin with an obvious, but important point.
From the ex ante perspective, the approach of the 1976 Act and the
CTEA increases the risk of investment in authorship. Authors who
live longer than their life expectancy will win; authors who die pre-
maturely will lose.255 Because most authors cannot predict their life
expectancy with a high degree of confidence, most authors do not
know whether they will win or lose, and hence they are exposed to
risk.256 When the future income stream is discounted by the
252. For example, extending the term from 208 years to 500 years would add
eight cents of discounted present value.
253. See, e.g., Coenen & Heald, supra note 71, at 100; Gordon, supra note
208, at Part III; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legis-
lative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on
Congress, 2000 ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1173-74.
254. Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a "Lifetime-
Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analy-
sisfor Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LoY. L. REV. 437, 449-57 (2002).
255. See id.
256. Of course, some authors do know with a high degree of certainty that
they are likely to suffer a premature death. Thus, a young author with an
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probability that the author will live to various ages, the expected
value of the two regimes is the same (assuming an author with aver-
age risk factors for mortality at the various ages), but risk is in-
creased. Tor and Oliar argue that rational authors would demand a
premium for the additional risk, and hence would prefer a fixed
term.
257
Tor and Oliar then proceed to examine the ways in which the
behavioral effects of a lifetime-plus-years regime might differ from
the simple rational choice model.258  They argue that the
psychological evidence "reveals two sets of cognitive processes that
are likely to cause potential authors to overestimate the duration...
of copyrights they obtain under a lifetime-plus-years regime." 259 The
first cognitive process is simply optimism regarding longevity; most
of us assume we will live longer than the average life expectancy.
260
Second, perhaps surprisingly, the psychological literature reveals that
copyright terms broken into two categories (the lifetime category and
the plus-years category) are systematically perceived as larger than
an equivalent term presented in only one category.2 6' Indeed, Tor
and Oliar present experimental evidence indicating that these two ef-
fects are significant in the context of authors choosing between fixed
terms and a lifetime-plus-years regime.262 Thus, their analysis would
seem to favor Congress's decision in 1976 to adopt a lifetime-plus-
50-years regime rather than simply to extend terms.
Tor and Oliar do not, however, believe that their analysis and
data supports the CTEA's extension of copyright terms from lifetime
plus fifty years to lifetime plus seventy years. Although there is evi-
dence that discount rates actually decline over the short term, as the
incurable disease is highly likely to be a loser. Likewise, a young author who
has fewer risk factors than the average author (does not smoke, drink, has a
family history of longevity, etc.) might have good reason to believe that she is
much more likely to be a winner than a loser from a lifetime-plus-years re-
gime. It goes without saying that older authors know that they would be better
off with a fixed term equally the average life expectancy of authors plus sev-
enty years.
257. See Tor & Oliar, supra note 254, at 452. ("Rational authors, however,
would not seek to gamble their investments.").
258. See id. at 449-57.
259. Id. at 458.
260. See id. at 459-62.
261. See id. at 462-80.
262. See id. at 476-80.
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time horizon becomes longer, "discount rates remain stable, hovering
around a 25% discount regression line." 263 This is, of course, an
enormously high discount rate. Translated to the example illustrated
above, it results in the following expected value calculations for
years 51-56 of the copyright term:
Table 6: Discounted Present Value Increase for Terms Past 50 Years
Discounted Total DiscountedYear Royalty Present Value Present Value
51 $ 605.01 $ 0.01 $ 3,998.51
52 $ 598.96 $ 0.01 $ 3,998.51
53 $ 592.97 $ 0.00 $ 3,998.52
54 $ 587.04 $ 0.00 $ 3,998.52
55 $ 581.17 $ 0.00 $ 3,998.52
56 $ 575.35 $ 0.00 $ 3,998.53
In other words, the expected value added by extending the copyright
term past the fiftieth year is virtually zero. It becomes insignificant,
in fact, after the twenty-eight years allowed by the Act of 1790. Al-
though discount rates may be lower for very long periods, Tor and
Oliar suggest it might be as low as 4%, the additional incentive pro-
vided by the CTEA's twenty-year extension would still be insignifi-
cant. 
2 6 4
3. Does the CTEA violate the "limited Times" constraint
Although the Petitioners in Eldred focus on retroactivity, Scott
Martin addresses the question whether the life-plus-70-years term
provided by the CTEA is constitutionally excessive. Martin argues
that this term is not "an abuse of discretion. 265 It is somewhat diffi-
cult to discern what legal argument Martin is making. If the question
is whether the term prescribed by the CTEA is for a "limited Time,"
then "discretion" is simply irrelevant. Congress does not have dis-
cretion to prescribe an unlimited term. If Martin is arguing that
Congress has a rational basis for the term chosen in the CTEA, then
the arguments he advances fail to establish his conclusion. Martin
263. Id. at 485.
264. See id.
265. Martin, supra note 16, at 282.
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observes that Congress did not extend the term for 100 years beyond
the minimum required by the Berne Treaty,266 but this does not
establish that the current term has a rational basis or that it "pro-
mote[s] the Progress of Science." Martin also argues that the Berne
Treaty established the life-plus-50-year-term ninety-four years ago,
and he seems to believe that this ninety-four year period is relevant
to the question whether an extension is "an abuse of discretion."
267
This claim is utterly mystifying: why would the duration of the
Berne Treaty affect the rationality of an extension beyond the term
required by the treaty? Martin also argues that the term under U.S.
law is short compared to that of many of our trading partners.
268
Here Martin is on firmer ground. Although the practices of other
nations do not establish that the U.S. term is for a "limited Time[]" in
the constitutional sense, the comparison is surely at least relevant to
the inquiry.
Martin also addresses the question of the original understanding.
He argues that the sole purpose of the "limited Times" 269 language
was to avoid "the common law system of perpetual copyright. 27 °
Martin provides no evidence at all for this conclusion. Based on his
ex cathedra pronouncement as to the purpose of the limited times re-
quirement, Martin concludes that "the authority of courts to review
the duration of copyright, established as a policy matter by Congress,
is limited to the question of whether the term of protection is fi-
nite." 271 But this conclusion does not follow from Martin's premises.
If the Framers did intend to preclude perpetual terms, they must have
done so for a reason. It is difficult to conceive of any reason for op-
posing perpetual terms that would not also provide reasons to oppose
very lengthy terms. Indeed, given that the CTEA can, in some cir-
cumstances, produce a copyright term of 150 years or more,272 the
burden is on Martin to explain just what reason there could be for
266. See id. at 281-82
267. Id. at 282
268. See id.
269. Martin uses the phrase "limited terms" instead of "limited Times"
throughout his article.
270. Martin, supra note 16, at 287.
271. Id.
272. For example, a future Irving Berlin might compose a song at age twenty
in 2002 and live until 2082, triggering the additional seventy-year period that
would last until 2152.
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opposing perpetual copyright that would not also be a reason for op-
posing at least the most lengthy terms authorized by the CTEA.
B. The Free Speech Question
The second question for which certiorari was granted reads: "Is
a law that extends the term of existing and future copyrights "cate-
gorically immune from challenge[] under the First Amendment"? 273
Copyright provisions are rarely challenged on First Amendment
grounds, and Scott Martin's contribution summarizes the two princi-
pal reasons. First, copyright protects particular expressions, but does
not protect ideas or facts.2 74 Second, the fair use doctrine allows at
least some copying of expression.275 Of course, copyright law also
furthers First Amendment values by providing incentives for speech
and for the press. Given these basic contours, copyright and free
speech will rarely collide, and because the collisions are rare, it is
sometimes assumed that copyright cannot violate the freedom of
speech. That assumption is, of course, invalid. It is easy to imagine
a copyright law that would run afoul of the First Amendment. For
example, a copyright statute that allowed the supporters of Congress
to copyright their remarks, but excluded criticism of Congress from
the protection of copyright would surely be an invalid content-based
restriction.
Erwin Chemerinsky's contribution to the Symposium, Balanc-
ing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copy-
right Extension Act is Unconstitutional offers a lucid and straight-
forward analysis of the constitutional question in Eldred. 6
Chemerinsky argues for a balancing approach, and concludes that the
balance should be struck against retroactive extensions of copyright
terms. Chemerinsky's nuanced discussion of the leading case on the
first amendment implications of copyright, Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,277 is aimed at disproving the
273. Petitioners Brief, supra note 6, at i.
274. See Martin, supra note 16, at 302.
275. See id.
276. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Free-
dom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 83 (2002).
277. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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proposition that copyright laws are categorically exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.
278
Chemerinsky then argues that copyright laws are not content-
based, because the target of copyright laws is not the viewpoint, sub-
ject matter, or communicative impact of the infringing speech, but is,
instead, the impact of infringement on the incentive to produce new
works.279 Thus, Chemerinsky rejects the argument that copyright is
content-based, because infringement depends on the content of the
allegedly infringing work. Surely, Chemerinsky is right to argue that
this kind of content discrimination is quite different than discrimina-
tion based on viewpoint or subject matter. Chemerinsky concludes
that copyright regulations should be subject to intermediate scru-
* 280tiny. It is not surprising that the CTEA's retroactive extension of
copyright would fail intermediate scrutiny-the costs of curtailing
public domain would seem to clearly outweigh the minimal benefits
of retroactive extension.
281
The First Amendment question on which certiorari was granted
is not whether the CTEA violates the First Amendment, but the nar-
rower question as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that copyright provisions are categorically immune from First
Amendment scrutiny. This provides the Supreme Court with a con-
venient device for avoiding almost all of the difficult and far-
reaching issues that are raised by Eldred. The Court can simply hold
that copyright provisions are not categorically immune and remand
to the District of Columbia Circuit for that court to address the First
Amendment question on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION: HARD CASES AND BAD LAW
Eldred is a hard case, for a somewhat unusual reason. For more
than 200 years, the Supreme Court has avoided construction of the
fundamental limiting terms of the Copyright Clause. There is no
well-developed body of constitutional law that defines Congress's
power to promote the progress of science. There are no clearly de-
fined criteria for what constitutes a limited time. There is a
278. See Chemerinsky, supra note 276, at 86-88.
279. See id. at 93-94. (citing to Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 48-49, 54-59 (2001)).
280. See id. at 94.
281. See id. at 95-97.
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constitutional vacuum. We might say that law, like nature, abhors a
vacuum. Since 1790, Congress and the courts have given the copy-
right regime a definite shape and texture. The Constitution specifies
the aim of copyright law as the encouragement of science. Congress
has crafted a copyright regime that promotes the motion-picture, re-
cording, and publishing industries. The Constitution specifies a lim-
ited term. Congress has adopted a term of life plus seventy years, a
term that in some cases will be quintuple the original maximum of
twenty-eight years. The Constitution demands that Congress be mo-
tivated by the creation of works in the future. Congress has been
concerned most by the profits of those who created works in the past.
In other words, there is today an enormous gap between consti-
tutional theory and legislative practice, between the ideals of the
founding era and the reality of copyright politics. The woof and
warp of modem copyright law cannot easily be reconciled with Con-
gress's constitutional power "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies,,282
This situation leaves the Supreme Court of 2002 with a poten-
tially tragic choice. The Court can assume the responsibility that
prior Courts have evaded, and breathe life into the Copyright Clause.
This restoration would fulfill the Court's fundamental responsibility
to uphold the rule of law, but it also creates the risk of disrupting a
vast intellectual property industry and overthrowing settled expecta-
tions. The Court has another choice. It can resolve Eldred on nar-
row grounds, for example, on the ground that the District of Colum-
bia Circuit erred in holding that copyright laws are categorically
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. This choice leaves the
problem for another day. But as the years pass, the gap between the
Constitution and the copyright statutes seems to grow larger and lar-
ger. Postponing the pain in this case, as in many others, is likely
only to make it worse. And so the Court must choose.
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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